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ABSTRACT
Wherever the art of Medicine is loved, there is also a love of Humanity.
Hippocrates 400 BC

Not many constitutional decisions from developing countries find themselves at the center of global
debate like the Indian Supreme Court’s Novartis decision invalidating the Gleevec patent. The
patent was invalidated under amended Section 3(d) of the Indian Patents Act, which was amended
to address some of the concerns of imbalance between the maximalist and minimalist cultures in the
pharmaceutical context. Section 3(d) of the Indian Patent Act introduced a new threshold of patent
eligibility for pharmaceutical innovation that requires applicants to demonstrate enhanced efficacy
of their products. The objective of this Article is to get beyond the reactionary reviews of the Indian
patent regime and seek a nuanced view of its doctrinal trajectory. The Article achieves this by
deconstructing Section 3(d) by focusing on its legislative intent, extracting its human rights
dimension, and tracing its harmonizing elements. In the end, the Article serves to dispel the myth of
Section 3(d)’s TRIPS incompatibility, unearths Section 3(d)’s human rights dimension, and
rehabilitates India’s intellectual property regime amidst a global condemnation of its minimalist
viewpoint.
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3(D) VIEW OF INDIA’S PATENT LAW: SOCIAL JUSTICE ASPIRATION MEETS
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN NOVARTIS V. UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS
SABY GHOSHRAY*
I. INTRODUCTION
Pharmaceutical companies have practiced the art of extending market
exclusivity for much of the twentieth century. In the name of product life cycle
management, these innovators seek to extract corporate monopoly rent,1 almost for

* © Saby Ghoshray 2014. Dr. Saby Ghoshray specializes in Constitutional Law, International
Human Rights Law, Intellectual Property Law and Capital Jurisprudence, among others. His work
has appeared in Albany Law Review, ILSLA Journal of International and Comparative Law,
European Law Journal ERA-Forum, Toledo Law Review, Georgetown International Law Review,
Temple Political & Civil Rights Law, Fordham International Law Journal, Santa Clara Law Review
and Miami Law Review, to name a few. The author would like to thank Jennifer Schulke for her
assistance in legal research and typing of the manuscript. Also, to my beautiful children, Shreyoshi
and Sayantan, your simplicity, curiosity and quest for rightful living motivates and inspires me,
everyday. I offer much appreciation to the members of The John Marshall Review of Intellectual
Property Law Editorial Board for their thoughtful suggestions and dedication in the edit process.
Finally, to every child, woman and man that labors under the blazing sun, and seeks relief from life
saving medicines, I dedicate this Article. My hope, this small work can awaken the humanistic
attitudes in the pharmaceutical industry, and no person, young or old, ever goes without life saving
medicines. Dr. Ghoshray can be reached at sabyghoshray@sbcglobal.net.
1 Saby
Ghoshray, Interpreting Myriad:
Acquiring Patent Law’s Meaning Through
Contemporary Jurisprudence and Humanistic Viewpoint of Common Heritage of DNA, 10 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 508, 511 n.15 (2011). In that I Article, I stated:

By “corporate monopoly rent-seeking,” I generally draw attention to the corporate
practices where the corporate entity attempts to derive economic benefits by extracting
economic rent via manipulating the existing socio-political landscape. In this context,
rent-seeking occurs as the corporate entity extracts additional value by various means,
such as imposing barriers to entry to other competitors or developing unilateral ability to
fix a higher than normal market price. The term “monopoly” is included in the
description to capture a unique dimension of such uncompensated value extraction in
that the corporate entity enjoys monopoly privileges under the guidance of legal or
regulatory framework. Originally introduced in 1967, the concept of “rent-seeking” was
formalized in 1974 and identified as distinct from the basic profit-seeking behavior of
economic agents.
See generally Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs,
Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 225 (1967) (introducing the idea of “rent-seeking”);
Anne Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV.
291 (1974) (formalizing the same concept). In the present context, I draw a distinction
between profit-seeking and rent-seeking behaviors of bio-technology companies, where
the former engages in mutually agreeable financial transactions within an efficient
market environment, but where the later [sic] extracts abnormal profits in a skewed
market environment by foreclosing other competitors’ meaningful opportunities to
compete due to patent exclusivity for a significant period of time.

Id.
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perpetuity, either through patent evergreening,2 or to a limited extent, through
patent layering.3 By marketing the hackneyed rationale of commercial incentive for
innovation, these companies have been advancing their market exclusivity
strategies,4 while obfuscating the market impact of predatory pricing to poorer
segments of humanity.5 Impacted asymmetrically by this quintessential dichotomy,
countries have walked divergent paths in formulating their respective patent
systems.6
2 Evergreening refers to the slew of business strategies and legal maneuverings to extend
market exclusivity of products, and in the process continuing to extract their monopoly rent-seeking
practices. See Sarah Harding, Perpetual Property, 61 FLA. L. REV. 285, 303–05, 315–16 (2009). In
the domain of pharmaceutical products, evergreening may cover practices such as taking out new
patents by simply changing form and method of administering dosage of a particular medicine
without changing the active ingredients, or taking out new patents on a mixture of delivery
mechanism and non-substantive mixture in the originally patent drug, thereby delaying the patent
of the original patent. See Thomas Faunce, The Awful Truth About Evergreening, THE AGE(Aug. 7,
2004,http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/08/06/1091732084185.html. Thus, neither recognized
in judicial opinions, nor codified within statutes, the phenomenon of evergreening can be seen as a
maneuver utilized by patent holders to use existing legal and regulatory loopholes to extend patent
exclusivity of their products. See Tahir Amin & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Secondary Patenting of
Branded Pharmaceuticals: A Case Study Of How Patents On Two HIV Drugs Could Be Extended
For Decades, 31 HEALTH AFFAIRS 2286, 2286–87 (2012) (explaining this concept by showing how
pharmaceutical companies engage in evergreening by sequentially seeking patent protections, either
via incremental improvement to a single drug, or patenting multiple characteristics of a single drug.
NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT. RESEARCH AND EDUC. FOUND., CHANGING PATTERNS OF
PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 1 (2002) [hereinafter NIHCM STUDY] (examining the effects of
manufacturers modifying products that are branded and approaching patent expiration in order to
delay competition posed by generic brands).
3 Often used interchangeably in the literature, there is a fine line of distinction between patent
evergreening
and
patent
layering.
Evergreening, EUR. GENERIC MED. ASS’N,
http://www.egagenerics.com/gen-evergrn.htm (last visited May 3, 2014); see also Michael Enzo
Furrow, Pharmaceutical Patent Life-Cycle Management after KSR v. Teleflex, 63 FOOD DRUG L.J.
275, 276 (2008); Edson Beas Rodrigues, Jr. & Bryan Murphy, Brazil’s Prior Consent Law: A
Dialogue Between Brazil and the United States Over Where the TRIPS Agreement Currently Sets
the Balance Between the Protection of Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to Medicines, 16 ALB.
L.J. SCI. & TECH. 423, 431 (2006) (noting that a strategy commonly described as “evergreening” is
aimed at extending the commercial life of patent protection through new medical use patents).
Patent layering can be seen as different from patent evergreening, when multiple characteristics of
a single drug is used to obtain market exclusivity, without altering the active ingredients of the drug
itself. Patent layering can also be seen as a subset within the broader connotation of patent
evergreening, which conveys the meaning of market exclusivity extending strategy in general.
While patent evergreening can be seen as a continuation mechanism to perpetuate or evergreen a
prior proprietary status, patent layering can be seen as creating a portfolio from a single source, by
utilizing various inherent characteristics of the source. Developing such a portfolio allows the
benefit of multiple sequential temporal segments such that the portfolio acts as an extension of the
source, thereby extending the original temporal segment into a bigger temporal segment.
4 See WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, PATENT LAW AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: AN EXAMINATION OF THE DRUG PRICE COMPETITION AND PATENT
TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1984 (THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT) 2–3 (2005).
5 See Greg Martin, Corinna Sorenson & Thomas Faunce, Balancing Intellectual Monopoly
Privileges and the Need for Essential Medicines, GLOBALIZATION AND HEALTH (June 12, 2007),
http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/3/1/4.
6 Here I draw attention to the maximalist versus minimalist debate in intellectual property
law. The term “maximalist” is used to describe a position/theme and emphasis is placed on the
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The better part of the twentieth century witnessed two diametrically discordant
patent regimes in the world. Riding a maximalist rights culture,7 pharmaceutical
patents exploded in the developed nations.8 At the same time, concern for wider
access to medicine prompted the developing countries to allow the low priced generic
drug industries to thrive.9 Failure to balance the rights of both the innovator and
those of the end users has allowed pharmaceutical giants to reap financial bonanza,
while a lack of access to life saving drugs has caused millions of people to perish.10
The arrival of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (“TRIPS”) in 199511 and its progeny, International Intellectual Property
inclusion of all factors possible associated with the position. Whereas, the term “minimalist” is used
to describe a position/theme and emphasis is placed on eliminating any extra factors and reducing
down to only the necessary elements. By the time developing countries arrived at the world stage as
independent nations by shedding their colonial shackles, developed countries have already forged
ahead in technology and have fenced their industrial interests with a maximalist, property rights
based intellectual property paradigm. Seeking their new international economic order, developing
countries relied on a minimalist vision of intellectual property framework that focused on wider
access and less on corporate monopoly—thus, initiating two diverging paths through which the
intellectual property regimes in the developing and the developed nations began its maturation
process. See James Boyle, Enclosing the Genome: What the Squabbles over Genetic Patents Could
Teach Us, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 97, 107–08 (F. Scott
Kieff ed., 2003) (examining the tension between maximalist and minimalist perspectives within the
context of gene patenting).
7 See id.
8 See, e.g., PATENT TECH. MONITORING TEAM, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., U.S. PATENT
STATISTICS CHART CALENDAR YEARS 1969–2013 (2014), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/
ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm. Between 1979 and 2008, the number of patents granted in the U.S.
almost quadrupled, from 52,000 in 1979 to 182,000 in 2008. Id. Similar explosions have been
observed in the EU, almost tripling between 1985 and 2005.
9 See Martin Khor, Generics under Threat: Can India Still Supply Cheap Medicines for the
World?, 259 THIRD WORLD RESURGENCE 4, 4–5 (2012).
10 Id. at 5.
11 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS] (setting forth obligations for patent protection).
Despite the WTO granting developing countries (“DC”) and least developed countries (“LDC”)
transitional periods to comply with all the provisions of TRIPS:
[t]o the extent that a developing country Member is obliged by this Agreement to extend
product patent protection to areas of technology not so protectable in its territory on the
general date of application of this Agreement for that Member, . . . it may delay the
application of the provisions on product patents of Section 5 of Part II to such areas of
technology for an additional period of five years.

See TRIPS, art. 65.4. TRIPS is very pejorative in its implications for both these groups of countries.
The TRIPS Agreement’s explicit requirement to harmonize patent terms for a minimum of twenty
years and to grant patents in all fields of technology has raised concerns about its effects on both DC
and LDCs.
Moreover, as the TRIPS Agreement mandates all member States to develop
patentability criteria on standards drawn from U.S. law, concerns have also been raised that TRIPS
may be lacking both the DC and LDC countries’ unique interests. See Karin Timmermans & Togi
Hutadjulu, The TRIPS Agreement and Pharmaceuticals: Report of an ASEAN Workshop on the
TRIPs Agreement and its Impact on Pharmaceuticals, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 14, 20–21 (May 2–4,
2000) (examining significant divergence amongst the jurisdictions in existing concepts surrounding
knowledge accumulation, processing, and applying).
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Agreements (“IIPA”),12 have consolidated the patent protection landscape in favor of
the pharmaceutical giants. This has directly impacted the developing nations’ fight
against evergreening and patent layering, as one hundred and fifty-nine members of
the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) became obligated to relax their patentability
standards.13Under the threat of TRIPS, Indian patent law also needed a facelift.
Following its TRIPS obligation, Indian legislators rose up to the challenge of
recalibrating its patent regime. Indian lawmakers introduced an amendment to the
Indian Patents Act in 2005, carrying the aspirations of billions of impoverished
citizens, inside India and abroad.14 The lawmakers amended Section 3(d), which
quickly gained worldwide notoriety.15 This notoriety has grown even more since the
Swiss Pharmaceutical giant Novartis failed at its § 3(d) challenge in the Indian
Supreme Court.16 Novartis’ legal battle in India started in 2005, when the Indian
Patent Office rejected its Gleevec patent application,17 which the company
challenged, citing § 3(d)’s unconstitutionality and incompatibility with TRIPS.18 By
the time Novartis’ appeal trekked its way through the Madras High Court and
eventually in front of the Supreme Court, more than seven years passed.19 Despite
the delays, the Supreme Court upheld both the Patent Office’s and the High Court’s
core findings.20 Mixed reactions have greeted the ruling since then. Legal scholars
have both defended and condemned the decision.21 Pharmaceutical companies have

12 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, N.Y.C., U.S. & Geneva, Switz.,
International
Investment
Arrangement:
Trends
and
Emerging
Issues,
44,
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2005/11 (2006).
13 See generally Understanding the WTO: The Organization Members and Observers, WORLD
TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited May 3,
2014) [hereinafter Understanding WTO].
14 See The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 15 of 2005, INDIA CODE (2005), § 3(d) [hereinafter
Amendment Act of 2005].
15 See George Best & Photon Rao, Drug Patenting in India:
Potentially Lucrative, but a
Difficult Task, 8 PHARM. L. & INDUS. REP. 46, 46 (2010).
16 See Gardiner Harris & Katie Thomas, Low Cost Drugs in Poor Countries Get a Lift in Indian
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/02/business/global/top-court-inindia-rejects-novartisdrug-patent.html?partner%3Drss%26emc%3Drss.
17 Novartis AG v. Union of India, Misc. Petition Nos. 1-5 of 2007 in TAII- 5/2007/PT/CH &
Misc. Petition No. 33 of 2008 in TA/1/2007/PT/CH & TA/1-5/2007/PT/CH, at 153, 157, 161
(Intellectual Property Appellate Board June 26, 2009), available at http://www.imak.org/storage/Gleevec%20IPAB%20decision%2026%20June%202009.pdf [hereinafter Novartis
IPAB Order]; Novartis Ag v. Union Of India & Ors., (April 1, 2013) ____ S.C.R. ____, Civil Appeal
Nos.
2706-2716,
2728,
and
2717-2727,
¶ 172
(India),
available
at
https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/11889318/gleevec [hereinafter Novartis Supreme Court
Decision].
18 Novartis Supreme Court Decision, supra note 17, ¶ 172.
19 Id.; Novartis AG v. Union of India & Ors. [2007] 2007 A.I.R. 24759, 4 MLJ 1153 (India
Madras H.C.) [hereinafter Novartis Madras H.C. Decision].
20 Id.
21 See Dhanalakshmi Iyer, Analysis of Section 3(d) of Indian Patent Act, IP FRONTLINE (Apr. 9,
2012), http://www.ipfrontline.com/depts/printabletemplate.aspx?id=26756 (stating that “section 3(d)
encourages sequential developments of existing products or technologies that help bring in improved
products” into the marketplace); Manoj Pillai et al., Patent Procurement in India, INTELL. PROP.
OWNERS ASS’N 1, 25 (2007) (noting that Indian Patent Law is more restrictive when examining
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threatened to pull out of their Indian businesses.22 Countries have threatened to
impose trade sanctions on India.23 Taking a retrospective look, these reactions have
been either reactionary24 or purpose-driven.25 The analyses are either narrowly
tailored,26 or have missed the decision’s broader themes.27 The multinational
pharmaceutical companies and the patent attorneys backing them have been plainly
biased in their respective agendas.28 This Article seeks to deconstruct such false
narratives surrounding § 3(d).
Not many constitutional decisions from developing countries find themselves at
the center of global debate, especially not in the manner of a constitutional
invalidation, like that of Novartis’ Gleevec patent.29 These debates include the
quintessential tension between maximalist rights paradigm versus minimalist patent
framework,30 innovation suppression versus wider access to medicine,31 and
pharmaceutical patent applications and will “likely require evidence of significantly higher efficacy
in order to be granted.”).
22 See Tracy Staton, Pharma giants arm-twist U.S. government for IP action in India, FIERCE
PHARMA (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.fiercepharma.com/search/site/story%20pharma%20giants
%20arm%20twist%20us%20govern.
23 See Sachin Parashar, India-US Ties are Under Stress Again, this Time Over Trade and
Investment, TIMES OF INDIA (Feb. 23, 2014), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/indiabusiness/India-US-ties-are-under-stress-again-this-time-over-trade-and-investment/articleshow/
30915237.cms (explaining that India is a priority foreign country (“PFC”) and a PFC tag “can allow
the US to impose unilateral sanctions against India for domestic laws which deny benefits to the US
under any trade agreement.”).
24 See Staton, supra note 22.
25 See Lisa Kilday, Global IP Reaction to India’s Rejection of the Novartis Drug Patent,
IPWATCHDOG (May 28, 2013, 7:30 AM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/05/28/global-ip-reaction-toindias-rejection-of-the-novartis-drug-patent/id=40778/.
26 See Iyer, supra note 21.
27 Id.
28 A misplaced notion of potential revenue loss from reduced prosecution and due diligence
activities from scope reduction in the patentability criteria may have been one of the catalysts for
opposing the Novartis decision. Although Novartis relied on Section 3(d) as this Article has
established, Novartis is also about preferring a minimalist regime over its maximalist counterpart.
Yet, an adequate understanding of the minimalist paradigm’s scope can hardly justify the pervasive
condemnation by professionals and pharmaceutical companies in erecting a harder stance against
minimalist patent regimes. See Boyle, supra note 6 (discussing scope of minimalist paradigm in
gene patenting).
29 For an in-depth review of Gleevec’s chemical composition, bond structures, reactivity, see
Rajshree Chandra, The Role of National Laws in Reconciling Constitutional Right to Health with
TRIPS Obligations: An Examination of the Glivec Patent Case in India, in INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL
PUB. HEALTH: PATENT LAW AND ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MED. 381, 391 (Thomas Pogge, Matthew
Rimmer & Kim Rubenstein, eds., 2010).
30 See Cynthia M. Ho, Unveiling Competing Patent Perspectives, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1047, 1053
(2009),
available
at
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1011&context
=facpubs&sei-redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fscholar.google.com%2Fscholar%3Fq%3Drelated%3
AukDTSHAB2CAJ%3Ascholar.google.com%2F%26hl%3Den%26as_sdt%3D0%2C47#search=%22rela
ted%3AukDTSHAB2CAJ%3Ascholar.google.com%2F%22.
31 See id.
The basic premise of a patent is that the innovator should be compensated for
proprietary ideas conceived and formulated in the innovation. Taken to its logical extension, the
proposition holds that, if the commercial impetus is taken away, the frequency of innovation will
decrease. If the frequency of innovation is decreased, the ideas may not arrive at the market place,
which in turn might stymie discovery of life saving drugs. On the contrarian theme, it is argued
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corporate monopoly rent-seeking practices versus the collective utility of social
welfare.32 This Article captures these issues through the Novartis legal saga in
India. The objective of this work is to get beyond the reactionary reviews of the
Indian patent regime and seek a nuanced view of its doctrinal trajectory. The Article
achieves this by deconstructing § 3(d) by focusing on its legislative intent, extracting
its human rights dimension, and tracing its harmonizing elements. Section 3(d) of
the Indian Patent Act introduced a new threshold of patent eligibility for
pharmaceutical innovation that requires applicants to demonstrate enhanced efficacy
of their products.33 Failing to satisfy this § 3(d) threshold, first at the Patent Office
and later before the Madras High Court on appeal, Novartis’ suit arrived at the
Indian Supreme Court.34 Centered on two distinct threads, Novartis argued for
invalidating § 3(d)’s heightened threshold on account of its TRIPS incompatibility
and unconstitutionality under the Indian Constitution.35 This Article addresses the
merits of both of these challenges and seeks to rehabilitate § 3(d) within the global
intellectual property landscape by shedding revelatory light on its genesis and
implications. Amidst a flawed condemnation of Indian intellectual property regime,
this work further recasts the patentability debate by tracing the TRIPS’ colonialist
root within the quintessential maximalist vs. minimalist debate. This debate has
thus far ignored the harmonization requirement of global patent law.36
In Part II of this Article, I delve into a background analysis of the Novartis case.
Here, Gleevec’s patent history and chemical composition, in conjunction with a
chronology of Novartis’ legal journey through the India legal landscape, provides a
context for the core issues before the Supreme Court. From the anatomy of the case,
I move on to deconstructing the contentious Section 3(d) in two parts in Part III.
Analyzing the text, motivation, and legislative development of the amendments in
§ 3(d) allows me to decode the efficacy standard and its implication for
that, shared heritage of humanity and our civilization’s human rights commitment makes it
incumbent upon us to ensure medicine can be widely accessed by all individuals regardless of their
ability to pay, which in turn would argue for reducing the scope of patent to relax the exclusivity
enjoyed by the pharmaceutical companies. Within this protectionist paradigm, it is argued, resides
the driving force for continued innovation in science and technology. This is a flawed argument, as
it is the spirit of cooperation and mutual learning that has advanced human construct incrementally
towards acquiring more meaning from existing process and objects. Moreover, most of today’s
scientists work in the academia under the paradigm of publish-or-perish. Therefore, the search for a
new product for the benefit of mankind cannot stop if the number of patents gets reduced, or the
scope of patenting becomes restrictive, rather too much power at the hands of a corporation that
develops a predatory practice that excludes the majority of the end user from enjoying the fruits of
labor, especially if the products are pharmaceutical or biological in nature.
32 By its monopoly rent-seeking behavior, holders of patent extracts additional value by various
means, imposing barriers to entry to other competitors, while foreclosing wider access to patented
product. Thus, by such deterministic principles of patentability, exclusivity is fostered within
society, economic incentive remains restricted to a limited few, and the majority is deprived of the
fruits of labor, such as access to medicine.
33 See Amendment Act of 2005, supra note 14, § 3(d).
34 Novartis Supreme Court Decision, supra note 17, ¶¶ 15, 18, 190.
35 Id. ¶ 15.
36 The emerging connectivity of our existences and the shared evolution of our ways of life
make it difficult to navigate within individual jurisdictional idiosyncrasies, which invites us to
examine the need for harmonization in law across the different jurisdictions.
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pharmaceutical scope reduction. I then examine § 3(d) TRIPS’ compatibility in Part
IV. Reviewing the genesis of TRIPS and its contentious history provides a backdrop
to view India’s intellectual property aspirations within its patent amendment. This
leads me to examine Novartis’ expanded meaning and future implications in Part V.
The Article concludes in Part VI, by establishing the main objectives of the work—
which are to dispel the myth of § 3(d)’s TRIPS incompatibility, to unearth § 3(d)’s
human rights dimension, and to rehabilitate India’s intellectual property regime
amidst a global condemnation of its minimalist viewpoint.
II. PATH TO THE INDIAN SUPREME COURT
Evaluating Novartis’ position requires contextualizing 3(d)’s genesis with patent
history of Gleevec. In the late 1990s, the team of Ciba-Geigy scientists, led by
Nicholas Lydon, Elisabeth Buchdunger, and Jurg Zimmerman, invented imatinib.37
The first series of patents covering imatinib and its various salts were filed in
Switzerland in 1992 and in the EU, U.S., and other countries in 1993.38 Upon
formation of Novartis, out of Ciba-Geigy’s merger with Sandoz in 1996,39 a new
patent application on a specific polymorphic form, a beta-crystalline version of
imatinib, was filed in Switzerland. This beta crystalline form of imatinib mesylate
forms the active ingredient of the anti-cancer drug Gleevec, also known as Glivec.40
Between the years of 1997 and 1998, Novartis filed more patents covering this beta
crystalline form in various countries.41 The company received FDA approval and its
U.S. patent in 2003.42
Despite having been granted patents protection in many countries between 1993
and 1998, Novartis did not get the opportunity to file a patent in India. Instead, it
filed a “mailbox application” for patent in 1998.43 Prior to 2005, Indian patent regime
did not allow patent filing for pharmaceutical drugs.44 Interestingly, the expansion
37 See Elisabeth Buchdunger & Juerg Zimmerman, The Story of Gleevec, INNOVATION.ORG,
http://www.innovation.org/index.cfm/StoriesofInnovation/InnovatorStories/The_Story_of_Gleevec
(last visited May 3, 2014).
38 See Family List: US5521184 (A)—1996-05-28, ESPACENET PAT. SEARCH, http://worldwide.
espacenet.com/publicationDetails/inpadocPatentFamily?page=0&FT=D&CC=US&locale=en_EP&D
B=&NR=5521184A&date=19960528&ND=&KC=A (last visited May 3, 2014).
39 See Lawrence M. Fisher, Post-Merger Integration:
How Novartis Became No. 1,
STRATEGY+BUS. (Apr. 1, 1998), http://www.strategy-business.com/article/16383?gko=28081 (stating
that the “$30.09 billion merger of Sandoz and Ciba-Geigy, which was announced in early 1996, came
amid a flurry of big deals in the pharmaceutical industry”).	
  
40 Srividhya Ragavan, The Patent Failure of Novartis with Gleevec, LAIPLA 1, 1 (2013)
http://www.laipla.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/RagavanNovartisNoteApril2.pdf; see also Novartis
AG v. Natco Pharma & Others, Controller of Patents and Designs, Application No. 1602/MAS/1998
(2005) (India), available at http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1352538/.	
  
41 Ragavan, supra note 40, at 1 (cataloguing that Novartis had over 35 patents covering the
polymorphic form of Gleevec in various countries).
42 Orange Book:
Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/Scripts/cder/ob/docs/obdetail.cfm?Appl_No
=021588&TABLE1=OB_Rx (last updated May 3, 2014).
43 Ragavan, supra note 40, at 1.
44 The Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970, INDIA CODE (1970), § 5 [hereinafter The 1970 Act].
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of patent protection for Gleevec coincided with a transformation within Indian patent
regime. As a precondition to joining the WTO,45 India was required to amend its
Patent Law to allow pharmaceutical patents,46 which prompted the need to reformat
its patent regime in compliance with the intellectual property norms under TRIPS.47
Meanwhile, all patent applications were held in a mailbox waiting to be processed
once the amendments came into force in 2005.48 In the interim, the patent applicants
were granted Exclusive Marketing Rights (“EMR”).49 This allowed them to sell their
products, while preventing competitors from producing and selling generic version of
the drugs.50 Novartis received its EMR in 2003.51
Under the terms of the EMR, the applicant was to automatically lose its
exclusive marketing privilege if its pending patent application was rejected.52 The
legal battle began soon after Novartis was granted its EMR. Novartis filed
infringement suit against the generic companies that were producing Gleevec’s
generic versions in India prior to 2003.53 The injunction against the generic
companies saw the price of Gleevec skyrocketing in India.54 Against price increases
of 1000 percent, the generic drug makers, cancer patient advocacy groups, and legal
rights organizations brought pre-grant motions opposing the Gleevec patent.55 In
45 See Understanding WTO, supra note 13 (noting that by July 2008, 153 countries were
Member States in the WTO, including, in addition to the United States, Canada, and the European
Union, many developed and developing countries in Asia, Africa, Central and South America, and
the Middle East (e.g., China, India, Brazil, Rwanda, and UAE)).
46 TRIPS, supra note 11, art. 27.1.
47 Id. art. 65.4.
48 Id. art. 70.8(a)–(c). The amendments added were (a)–(c). Id.
49 Id. art. 70.9.
50 World Trade Org., TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patents: Developing Countries’ Transition
Periods, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/factsheet_pharm04_e.htm.
“Mailbox” is an interim administrative filing process for the efficient date stamping and processing
of new patent applications until the member country’s laws could harmonize to the standards set up
as conditions for their being part of the agreement. Id. Once the countries are caught up to the
standards, mailbox applications were to be processed according to their priority receipt date. Id.
Article 70 also imposed requirement on transitional members to grant Exclusive Marketing Rights
(“EMR”) for pharmaceuticals for which a patent and marketing approval had already been procured
in another member state and for which a patent application processing is pending with the
appropriate authority in that transitional member state. Id. EMR is to be granted by the
transitional member “for a period of five years after obtaining marketing approval in that Member
[state] or until a product patent is granted or rejected in that Member [state], whichever period is
shorter.” Id. TRIPS Agreement, Article 70.8(a) required India to “provide as from the date of entry
into force of the WTO Agreement a means by which applications for patents for such inventions can
be filed . . . .” Id. Thus, India had provided patent applicants with “mailbox” facility where all the
patent applications for pharmaceutical products filed during the transition period had to accepted
and stored for examination beginning in 2005. Id.
51 See Novartis Gets EMR for Glivec, THE ECON. TIMES, (Dec. 24, 2003, 9:24 PM), available at
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2003-12-24/news/27545132_1_gipap-emr-novartisindia.
52 TRIPS, supra note 11, art. 70.9.
53 See Shamnad Basheer, First Mailbox Opposition (Gleevec) Decided in India, SPICY IP (Mar.
11, 2006), http://spicyip.com/2006/03/first-mailbox-opposition-gleevec.html.
54 Id.
55 See Novartis Case:
Background and Update—Supreme Court of India to Recommence
Hearing, LAWYERS COLLECTIVE (Sept. 6, 2011), available at http://www.lawyerscollective.org/
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support of their position, these stakeholders cited Gleevec’s (i) lack of novelty under
anticipation, (ii) lack of added “efficacy” under Section 3(d), (iii) obviousness and (iv)
wrongful priority.56 Three years later, Novartis’ patent application was rejected by
the Chennai Patent Examiner’s Office on multiple grounds, chiefly relying on Section
3(d) of the newly amended Indian Patent Act.57 Thus, conceived out of India’s TRIPS
obligation to allow instances of Gleevec patents to be filed, Section 3(d) became
instrumental in rejecting Novartis’ right of market exclusivity in India.58
Contextualizing 3(d)’s place in the Gleevec’s patent denial calls for reviewing two
important issues: (1) how 3(d)’s efficacy requirement presents a higher threshold
than what the patent applicants were accustomed to, and (2) specifics surrounding
the chemistry of Gleevec. Knowing the chemical composition, reactivity, and
characteristics of Gleevec aids our understanding of how the functionality of
“efficacy” can be linked to evaluating patent eligibility of the pharmaceutical product
in question under the newly minted Section 3(d) of Indian Patent Act.59 It is
important to note that, for patent eligibility review, structural differences exist
amongst the various versions of imatinib. Of particular importance is the difference
between imatinib’s free base form and its beta crystalline form imatinib mesylate.60
With patent protection on thirty-five different forms of imatinib under its belt,
Novartis had filed its Indian patent application for a particular polymorphic version,
which is a methanesulfonic acid salt of imatinib.61 The task before the Indian patent
system was to determine whether the methanesulfonic acid version of imatinib
conveys a significant inventive step to warrant patent protection. Guided by the
Section 3(d)’s enhanced efficacy standard, the issue for the patent examiner was to
adjudicate whether the applied product contains significantly enhanced efficacy
compared its prior variants.62
Upon rejection of its patent application by the assistant controller of Patents,63
Novartis AG, along with its Indian subsidiary, Novartis India, filed two writ petitions
in the Madras High Court.64 The petitioners sought a reversal of the Assistant
Controller’s order by finding Section 3(d) invalid.65 Petitioners based their contention
news/archived-news-a-articles/126-novartis-case-background-and-update-supreme-court-of-india-torecommence-hearing.html.	
  
56 N. Lalitha, Access to Indian Generic Drugs:
Emerging Issues, in INTELLECTUAL PROP.,
PHARM.& PUB. HEALTH: ACCESS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 225, 238–39 (Kenneth Shadlen,
Samira Guennif, Alenka Guzman, & N. Lalitha, eds., 2011); see also Chandra, supra note 29, at
390–91.
57 Amendment Act of 2005, supra note 14, § 3(d).
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Ragavan, supra note 40, at 2.
61 Id. at 1–2.
62 Amendment Act of 2005, supra note 14, § 3(d).
63 See generally Novartis Madras H.C. Decision, supra note 19.
Novartis’ contention that
Gleevec was a new substance was rejected by the Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs. Id.
¶ 3. Observing that, although the new beta drug can be more effectively absorbed into the
bloodstream, this bioavailability did not meet the improvement in efficacy as required by Section
3(d), and as a result, the patent application did not present a new substance. Id.
64 See id.¶ 1.
65 Id.
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on two grounds: unconstitutionality on grounds of arbitrariness on part of the patent
examiner66 and lack of merit in violation of India’s TRIPS obligations.67 In 2007,
before the High Court could form its opinion, Novartis’ first petition was transferred
to the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (“IPAB”)68—a specialist tribunal set up
to deal with appeals from the various intellectual property offices across the country
pursuant to the Section 117G of the Indian Patent Act.69 In 2009, the IPAB amended
the decision of the Assistant Controller of Patents and Design in part by holding that
the product in question did not violate the novelty and non-obviousness criteria,70 but
failed the test of enhanced efficacy under 3(d).71 Empowered by the Special Leave
Petition (“SLP”) under Article 136 of the Indian Constitution,72 Novartis was able to
challenge directly to the Supreme Court in 2009,73 which eventually led to the
landmark decision of Novartis v. Union of India and Others on April 1, 2013
(“Novartis”).74
The legal battle over the Gleevec patent was fought over ten years, covering
issues from constitutionality of the amendments to the patent regime’s TRIPS
compatibility.75 However, as the case found its way from the IPAB to the Supreme
Court, the relevance of Section 3(d) gained primacy.76 It is time now to take a
comprehensive look at the Section 3(d) of the Indian Patent Act.

Id. ¶ 1.
Id.
68 Novartis Supreme Court Decision, supra note 17, ¶ 15.
69 The 1970 Act, supra note 44, § 117G. See also Linda L. Lee, Trials and TRIPS-ulations:
India Patent Law and Novartis AG v. Union of India, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 281, 287–88 (2008)
(noting that the Indian judicial system comprises a specialized tribunal entitled the Intellectual
Property Appellate Board (“IPAB”) established on September 15, 2003 to hear appeals from
Registrar of Trademarks and Geographic Indications and from the Controller of Patents).
70 Novartis IPAB Order, supra note 17, at 186.
71 Id. at 189 (finding that the Appellant has failed to satisfy the efficacy requirement for its
beta crystalline form of imatinib mesylate pursuant to section 3(d) of the Act).
72 INDIA CONST. art. 136, amended by The Constitution (Ninety-sixth Amendment) Act, 2011
(stating that the “Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any
judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any
court or tribunal in the territory of India”).
73 See Novartis AG v. Union of India and Others, SLP (Civil) Nos. 20539-20549 of 2009,
LAWYERS COLLECTIVE (Nov. 23, 2010), http://www.lawyerscollective.org/access-to-medicine/atmcurrent-cases.html [hereinafter Novartis, LAWYERS COLLECTIVE]; Novartis Supreme Court Decision,
supra note 17.
74 Novartis Supreme Court Decision, supra note 17, at ¶¶ 193–94. Here I draw attention to the
long drawn saga of Novartis’ fight with the Indian patent regime, which “eventually” was decided
against Novartis, after appealing all the way to the Indian Supreme Court regarding the
composition of the panel. Id.
75 See generally Timeline of Key Events in Novartis’s Attack on the Pharmacy of the
Developing World, DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS (last visited May 3, 2014), available at
http://www.msf.ie/timeline-key-events-novartiss-attack-pharmacy-developing-world
[hereinafter
Novartis Timeline].
76 Sarah Boseley, Novartis Denied Cancer Drug Patent in Landmark Indian Case, GUARDIAN
(Apr. 1, 2013 9:10 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/01/novartis-denied-cancer-drugpatent-india; see also Novartis Timeline, supra note 75.
66
67
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III. CONTEXTUALIZING SECTION 3(D): THROUGH MOTIVATION AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Much before the 2013 decision by the Indian Supreme Court, Section 3(d) had
already been subjected to a mixed review.77 Pharmaceutical companies condemned
its higher threshold of patentability for fear of losing their extended market
exclusivity.78
Scholars lauded its mechanism for preventing pharmaceutical
companies from extending their market exclusivity strategies.79 3(d)’s legislative
history of formulation is quite extensive. It reveals the lawmakers’ motivations,
which are both shaped by the Indian Constitution’s commitment to health and
colored by the aspirations of the millions relying on India as the only source of life
saving drugs.80 It is important, therefore, to review 3(d)’s development history, in
which the legislators had to grapple with the quintessential schism between the twin
strands of patentability—a western-centric maximalist property view, and the
developing countries’ public utilitarian minimalist perspective.81

77 See Iyer, supra note 21 (noting that India strictly limits the patenting of known medicines);
Manoj Pillai et al., supra note 21, at 24, 25 (emphasizing that Indian Patent Law is more restrictive
in the pharmaceutical context because section 3(d) was introduced to prevent “evergreening of
patents” and made pharmaceutical patents a focal point of international debate). The response to
3(d) has been mixed. Advancing a western centric viewpoint, some commentators criticized the
higher threshold of patentability implied in 3(d).
78 See Adam Taylor, Here’s The Patent Law That Is Allowing India To Smack Down Big
Pharma, THE BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 1, 2013), available at http://www.businessinsider.com/
novartis-loses-india-patent-case-2013-4 (“Novartis and other big drug companies say the ruling will
hurt innovation in India, and Novartis has threatened to stop supplying India with its drugs
following the ruling.”); Dwijen Rangnekar, Calling Big Pharma’s Bluff, THE HINDU (Apr. 3, 2013)
available
at
http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/calling-big-pharmas-bluff/article
4575235.ece.
79 See NIHCM Study, supra note 2, at 4; Cynthia M. Ho & Ann Weilbaecher, An Introduction—
Patents versus Patients: Must We Choose, 18 ANNALS OF HEALTH 1, 4 (2009), available at
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1110&context=annals.
80 See Randeep Ramesh, Cheap Indian Drugs Under Threat, THE GUARDIAN U.K. (Mar. 23,
2005), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/mar/23/india.aids1 (stating that millions
of patients around the world rely on inexpensive treatment from India); Indian Court Ruling in
Novartis Case Protects India as the ‘Pharmacy of the Developing World,’ DOCTORS WITHOUT
BORDERS (Aug. 6, 2007), available at http://www.msf.org.au/media-room/press-releases/pressrelease/article/indian-court-ruling-in-novartis-case-protects-india-as-the-pharmacy-of-thedeveloping-world.html (emphasizing that “millions of patients and doctors in developing countries”
rely on affordable medicines from India); Janice M. Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous
Transformation of India’s Patent System and Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation, 68 U. PITT.
L. REV. 491, 495 (2007). The amendment to § 3(d) was viewed by Lok Sabha member Suresh Kurup
as vital for preventing pharmaceutical companies from obtaining several patents on one medication.
See Transcript of Combined Discussion on the Statutory Resolution Re: Disapproval of Patents
(Amendment) Ordinance, 2004 (No. 7 of 2004) and the Patents (Amendment) Bill, 2005 (Resolution
negatived and Bill Passed) at *41–42, LOK SABHA (Mar. 22, 2005), available at
http://164.100.47.132/LssNew/psearch/result14.aspx?dbsl=1866.
81 See Ho, supra note 30, at 1049.
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A. Motivation and Context of Section 3(d)
The latter part of the twentieth century witnessed pharmaceutical giants
becoming successful in extending market exclusivity of their products in the
developing countries predominantly via two pathways. In the first, a strict property
rights paradigm took root within the various international trade agreements like
TRIPS.82 In the second, a narrative of commercial impetus for incremental
innovation as a precondition for wider access to life saving drugs has allowed
companies to dictate patentability dialogues.83
This allowed pharmaceutical
companies to shape patent regimes favoring market exclusivity extension
mechanisms in many developing countries.84 The reality of life-saving drugs drifting
out of reach for the poor has not gained much traction in these discussions.85
Dangling the carrot of membership to global trade organization was enough incentive
for developing countries to acquiesce into asymmetric bargaining power through
TRIPS. This in turn has allowed the imposition of strict property rights based on
patentability regimes, where each incremental innovation has become subject to
patent protection for the continuation of corporate monopoly rent-seeking. As such,
evergreening and patent layering has now become the norm in patentability
frameworks.
Evergreening is a term for corporate maneuvering where a product
manufacturer continues to extract patent protection on an originally patented
product for successive designated periods on more than one attribute, even though

82 See Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 369, 370–79,
383 (2006) (“[I]t is no surprise that less developed countries have been concerned about the
heightened protection required by the TRIPs Agreement and its deleterious impact in the areas of
agriculture, health, environment, education, and culture.”). While the U.S. and the U.K. led the
neo-liberal movement that imposed western strict constructionist view of property rights into the
various free trade agreements, U.S. laws eventually shaped the TRIPS agreements by imposing its
norms into the framework through the WTO mechanism. This view is corroborated by scholars who
see TRIPS as a product of unequal bargaining between developed and developing countries, where
instead of exchange of norms, asymmetric modalities have been coerced upon the developing
countries in the name of global harmonization. Therefore, instead of being left out, developing
countries accepted the requirement of the imposition of strong intellectual property rights within
their domestic legal regimes in order to enjoy the benefits of international trade.
83 Id. at 390.
84 Maximalist viewpoint of patent protection has allowed pharmaceutical companies in the
United States to utilize various market exclusivity extension strategies to maintain their patent
protections.
The National Institute of Health Care Management Research and Education
Foundation conducted a study in May 2002 and found that, between 1989 and 2000, only 35% out of
the 1035 new drugs approved by the USFDA entailed a new active principle. See NIHCM Study,
supra note 2, at 3. In other words, pharmaceutical companies were able to extend the lives of nearly
two-thirds of their already-patented drugs by making alterations to the drugs’ methods of
production, forms, or uses.
85 Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable
Standard of Physical and Mental Health, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil,
Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, ¶¶ 13–14
Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/12 (Mar. 31, 2009) (stating that over “100 million
people fall into poverty annually” because of healthcare costs and that approximately “2 billion
people lack access to essential medicines”).
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such attributes can be linked to a single product.86 The U.S. National Institute of
Health Care and Medicines took notice of this strategy as there was a concerted
effort by some companies to patent even minor modifications of an original product:
“[d]rug manufacturers patent a wide range of inventions connected with incremental
modifications of their products, including minor features such as inert ingredients
and the form, color, and scoring of tablets.”87 Section 3(d) was designed to prevent
this, as the following discussion of the text and explanation of the statute would
reveal. Section 3(d) reads as follows:88
(d) the mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does not
result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance or the
mere discovery of any new property or new use for a known substance or of
the mere use of a known process, machine or apparatus unless such known
process results in a new product or employs at least one new reactant.89
Explanation—For the purposes of this clause, salts, esters, ethers,
polymorphs, metabolites, pure form, particle size, isomers, mixtures of
isomers, complexes, combinations and other derivatives of known substance
shall be considered to be the same substance, unless they differ significantly
in properties with regard to efficacy.90

Thus, 3(d) establishes an extra layer of deterministic criteria in the patent
eligibility framework. This specific layer stipulates that, only those pharmaceutical
derivatives that can be demonstrated to exhibit significantly enhanced efficacy are
eligible for patent protection.91 This added layer would be a step towards real
innovation as opposed to claiming innovation on minor enhancement. Therefore, this
extra layer requiring enhanced efficacy would help in preventing fraudulent or
superfluous patent applications that are routinely sought through evergreening or
patent layering.92
Developments in both organic and inorganic chemistry, along with
advancement in quantitative techniques, opened much larger possibilities of product
formation via chemical reactions. By slight alteration of chemical bonds, or simple
86 Robert Chalmers, Evergreen or Deciduous?
Australian Trends in Relation to the
‘Evergreening’ of Patents, 20 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 29, 29 (2006) (stating that the term
“evergreening” refers to “the strategy adopted by patentees who seek to extend their period of patent
protection by applying for secondary patents over related or derivative technologies”).
87 NIHCM Study, supra note 2, at 16.
88 Amendment Act of 2005, supra note 14, § 3(d).
89 Id.
90 Id. (emphasis added).
91 Id. See also Novartis Supreme Court Decision, supra note 17, ¶ 103 (conducting a thorough
review of prior, existing and emerging patent landscape of India and taking stock of the legislative
history of the 2005 law, the Indian Supreme Court observed that Section 3(d) was meant to create a
“second tier of qualifying standards” for chemical substances to combat “any attempt at repetitive
patenting or extension of the patent term on spurious grounds”).
92 See infra Part IV.
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modification in starting reactions, a range of derivative products can be obtained
from an original product. Under a maximalist patent regime, pharmaceutical
companies can obtain market exclusivity on a wide range of related products, from
the original compound to its derivatives, which may arrive in varied chemical
structures, such as salts, polymorphs, and isomers.93 Maximalist patent regimes
allow pharmaceutical companies to develop derivatives of original patented product,
while also bestowing upon these companies patent exclusivity for years to come.94
Section 3(d) recognizes this.95 As each subsequent variant of a compound is
structurally equivalent to the original, either in their naturally existing forms, or as
known pharmaceutical substances,96 it is more likely than not that these structurally
similar substances are functionally equivalent. Therefore, 3(d)’s requirement of
enhanced efficacy of the derivative is more effectively shown by observing its
chemical interaction with other chemical compounds that offer the most significant
reactivity.97
The statute for 3(d) calls for a patent eligible product to be “efficacious,”98 or
have the attribute of enhanced efficacy over a prior known form, regardless of
whether the invention is incremental or groundbreaking. Here, 3(d) creates a “floor”
in demonstrating “efficacy,” while charting a layered patentability framework for
pharmaceutical products.99 Therefore, in order to claim patent, the onus of proving
enhancement—that of improved and enhanced functionality—would fall on the
patent applicant.100 Thus, imposition of this simple demonstrability barrier for
claiming a patent should be recognized as a process or instrumentality of bringing
improved chemical compounds to the market to make significant contributions as
pharmaceutical agents. This efficacy step certainly can distinguish between patent
applicants that arrive via evergreening and those that contain a rigorous inventive
step. Therefore, by making it mandatory for derivatives of known substances to
exhibit added efficacy, 3(d) encourages sequential development of improved products
to address significant public health needs.101

See Chandra, supra note 29, at 391.
Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 See infra Part IV.
98 See Shamnad Basheer & Prashant Reddy, The “Efficacy” of Indian Patent Law: Ironing Out
the
Creases
in
Section
3(d),
5
SCRIPTED
232,
234
(2008),
available
at
http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol5-2/basheer.pdf.
99 Id. at 238–39.
100 Amendment Act of 2005, supra note 14, § 3(d); Basheer & Reddy, supra note 98, at 239.
101 See Basheer & Reddy, supra note 98 at 239. See, e.g., Soutik Biswas, Novartis India Case:
Campaigners Hail Patent Rejection, BBC NEWS (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/business21992724; Indian Supreme Court Decision on Novartis Case a Victory for Access to Medicines in
Developing
Countries,
DOCTORS
WITHOUT
BORDERS
(Apr.
1,
2013),
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/press/release.cfm?id=6707&cat=press-release.
93
94
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B. A Chemical Composition Analysis
From the chemistry of the products, Novartis’ Gleevec represents a transition
from the discovery of the original free base to a polymorphic salt that is identified as
a useful drug.102 To contextualize Gleevec’s chemical characteristics in light of 3(d)’s
requirement, let us briefly review the highlighted steps in its U.S. Patent.103
1. The product in question focuses on a derivative obtained via synthesis
of the imatinib free base, a compound that was patented in the U.S., EU
and several other countries between 1993 and 1998.104 As India did not
provide product patents for pharmaceutical substances at that time,
this could not be patented in India.105
2. Imatinib mesylate was developed by adding methanesulfonic acid to the
imatinib free base, which converted the drug from a free base to a
salt.106
3. The polymorphic form of imatinib, a beta crystalline variant of imatinib
mesylate, has been recognized as the most stable form of the salt.
Novartis filed its patent application for this particular product and it is
this application that has been the focus of dispute in this patent saga.107
4. The anti-cancer drug Gleevec is based upon the above beta crystalline
form of imatinib mesylate.108
The 3(d) framework would require Novartis to demonstrate that Gleevec—the
beta crystalline form of imatinib mesylate—has an enhanced effectiveness over the
original imatinib free base.109 However, doing so under the 3(d) criteria would
require the applicant to first identify an appropriate benchmark to claim such
effectiveness.110 In its application, Novartis submitted that the new beta crystalline
form can be absorbed more easily into the blood stream,111 and this superior
bioavailability can be used as a benchmark to measure enhanced efficacy.112 This
See Chandra, supra note 29, at 391.
U.S. Patent No. 5,521,184 (filed Apr. 28, 1994); see also E.P. Patent No. 0,564,409 (filed
Mar. 25, 1993).
104 ‘184 Patent, at [22], [30], [45].
105 Basheer & Reddy, supra note 98, at 239.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 See Chandra, supra note 29, at 387 (stating that the “new Act’s section 3(d) limits patents
only to chemical entities that employ at least one new reactant”).
110 Basheer & Reddy, supra note 98, at 238–39.
111 Novartis Supreme Court Decision, supra note 17, ¶ 188.
112 Here bioavailability refers to the absorption—a physical process where molecules of the
original compound enters the spaces between the molecules of the solvent. It does not refer to a
more transformative binding stage of the drug in question. Thus, it cannot be used as a benchmark
for measuring efficacy of a drug. Id. ¶ 184; see also Lalitha, supra note 56, at 239.
102
103
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line of argumentation lacks structural merit, as the heightened absorption—easier
accumulation into the blood stream—does not meet the necessary criteria of
increased efficacy under Section 3(d).113 This was duly noted by the Supreme Court
in rejecting Novartis’ claim.114
Let us impart additional color to the efficacy discussion.
To achieve
enhancement in a characteristic, the first step is to identify an appropriate
benchmark. Therefore, to obtain an effective benchmark, in going from a prior
product to a newer product, the applicant must address the difference between the
original target outcome and the new intended target outcome. We present a
hypothetical scenario to illustrate the point.
A pharmaceutical company PC, having enjoyed the exclusivity of patent
protection for 18 years for its blood pressure medication BPR1, introduces
in the market a new product BPR2. BPR2 is a derivative of BPR1 with the
following results in random clinical trials prior to patent application: (i) the
average decrease of blood pressure in switching from BPR1 to BPR2 has not
been statistically significant; (ii) the average reduction of side effect from
muscle pain in BPR2 is statistically more significant in comparison to
BPR1. Could this be a demonstration of BPR2’s enhanced efficacy over
BPR1 and thus, patent eligible?
To capture the essence of above illustration, it must be noted that, the idea of
efficacy must revolve around improving the target condition for which the original
drug obtained its patent. Thus, in the case of the beta crystalline form of Gleevec,
merely showing an enhanced hygroscopic attribute of easier absorption cannot be
determined as a criterion for enhanced efficacy. Similarly, a mere reduction of a side
effect must not be construed as satisfying the heightened standard of 3(d).115 This
was the position held by the patent office and was subsequently upheld by the
Supreme Court.116 However, the issue of efficacy is a loaded term that warrants
further evaluation, as a series of questions can be raised.
For example, under what framework can we authenticate that the beta
crystalline form lacked efficacy?
What does the term efficacy mean?
Can
“therapeutic efficacy” be functionally equated with efficacy under Section 3(d)?117
What are some of the ways to construct benchmarks to measure efficacy for new
inventions in pharmaceutical products space? Although the Novartis decision by the
Supreme Court presented one view, the argument surrounding efficacy is not over
yet. Efficacy was a vehicle that the lawmakers introduced to fulfill their objective of
creating balance between a maximalist property rights framework and a wider
utilitarian theme. Now is the time to retrace some of the legislative history and
public sentiments that embodies Section 3(d).

113
114
115
116
117

See Novartis Supreme Court Decision, supra note 17, ¶ 187.
Id. ¶¶ 187–88, 190, 191.
Id. ¶¶ 189, 195.
Id. ¶ 195.
Id. ¶ 180 (stating that efficacy means “that ability to produce a desired or intended result”).
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C. Legislative History of Section 3(d)
Reviewing the landscape of the Indian Patent Act reveals that Section 3(d) is not
a sudden trajectory reversal, nor has it been a reactionary response to an altered
socio-political landscape.
Rather, 3(d) should be seen more as an organic
enhancement within the corpus of patentability within the broader Indian
intellectual property movement. Several other sections and chapters within Indian
Patent law have been the precursor of Section 3(d).
Multi-layer patent eligibility criteria are nothing new within the Indian
patentability framework, as has already been enshrined in the statutory provisions
within Section 2 of the Indian Patent Act.118 Section 3 instead provides clear
guidance to delineate amongst inventions, patentable inventions, and patentability
for incremental inventions.119 The Indian Supreme Court duly corroborated this in
noting that, “Section 3 of the Patent Act, which provided for exclusions from

118 The 1970 Act, supra note 44, §§ 2(1)(j)(i–iii), 2(1)(l)(i–v), 3(a–i).
Section 2 contained the
definition and interpretation clauses. It also defined the terms “invention” and “medicine” in
clauses (j) and (l) respectively as under subsection 1. Invention means any new and useful:

(i) art, process, method or manner of manufacture; (ii) machine, apparatus or
other article; (iii) substance produced by manufacture, and includes any new and
useful improvement of any of them, and an alleged invention.

Id. § 2(1)(j). Medicine or drug includes:
(i) all medicines for internal or external use of human beings or animals, (ii) all
substances intended to be used for or in the diagnosis, treatment, mitigation or
prevention of diseases in human beings or animals, (iii) all substances intended to
be used for or in the maintenance of public health, or the prevention or control of
any epidemic disease among human beings or animals, (iv) insecticides,
germicides, fungicides, weedicides and all other substances intended to be used
for the protection or preservation of plants; (v) all chemical substances which are
ordinarily used as intermediates in the preparation or manufacture of any of the,
medicines or substances above referred to.

Id. § 2(1)(l). Sections 1 and 2 comprised Chapter I, following which Chapter II was headed
Inventions not patentable. Chapter II had three sections which, as originally framed, are as under
Section 3:
What are not inventions. The following are not inventions within the meaning of
this Act,—(a) an invention which is frivolous or which claims anything obviously
contrary to well established natural laws ; (b) an invention the primary or
intended use of which would be contrary to law or morality or injurious to public
health; (c) the mere discovery of a scientific principle or the formulation of an
abstract theory; (d) the mere discovery of any new property or new use for a
known substance or of the mere use of a known process, machine or apparatus
unless such known process results in a new product or employs at least one new
reactant . . . .

Id. § 3.
119

See id.

[13:719 2014]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

738

patentability, was recast.”120 Furthermore, examination of the relationship between
the current version of Section 3(d) and Section 83 of Chapter 16 (“hereinafter Section
83”), reveals a commitment for commercial incentive for innovation, which is
punctuated with distinctions among classes of innovations along a patent eligibility
framework.121 In general, Section 3 of the Patent Act provides various exclusionary
provisions.122 Section 83 specifically addresses how patent law can be made
consistent with a nation’s social justice obligations in encompassing a utilitarian
theme by specifically adopting public welfare objectives.123 Unfortunately, this
minimalist paradigm is in sharp contrast to the property rights-focused maximalist
patent framework that came to embody the reformatting needs of developing
countries under TRIPS in the 1990s.124
Therefore, the condemnation of 3(d) has to be evaluated through multiple
competing dimensions. First, 3(d) symbolizes a utilitarian themed patent paradigm
that is inconsistent with the western viewpoint on intellectual property protection.125
Second, the neo-liberal drive to incorporate western property rights ideals within
TRIPS’ process instrumentalities does not comport with the social justice-centric
equality paradigm of 3(d).126 Yet the Indian lawmakers ensured that the social
justice component remained an integral part and that corporate monopoly rentseeking practices do not supersede broader public utility in their amendment to the
Indian Patent Act.
Keeping in view Section 3(d)’s shared ancestry with Section 83, further
reviewing its implications and objectives would not be out of place. Section 83
balances both fundamentals—India’s treaty obligations and India’s commitment to
social and economic welfare for the masses.127 Section 83, therefore, provides for
See Novartis Supreme Court Decision, supra note 17, ¶ 73.
The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 38 of 2002, INDIA CODE (2013), § 83, available at
http://indiacode.nic.in/ [hereinafter Amendment Act of 2002].
122 See Basheer & Reddy, supra note 98, at 238.
123 Amendment Act of 2002, supra note 121, § 83(d)–(g). Section 83 of Chapter 16, through
items (d) through (g) stipulates the following:
120
121

(d) that patents granted do not impede protection of public health and nutrition
and should act as instrument to promote public interest specially in sectors of
vital importance for socioeconomic and technological development of India; (e)
that patents granted do not in any way prohibit Central Government in taking
measures to protect public health; (f) that the patent right is not abused by the
patentee or person deriving title or interest on patent from the patentee, and the
patentee or a person deriving title or interest on patent from the patentee does
not resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the
international transfer of technology; and (g) that patents are granted to make the
benefit of the patented invention available at reasonably affordable prices to the
public.

Id.

See Yu, supra note 82, at 370–80.
See infra Part IV.
126 Id.
127 Novartis Supreme Court Decision, supra note 17, ¶ 68.3. The Statement of Objects and
Reasons for the Amendment Act of 2002 observes the following:
124
125
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commercial impetus through a layered patentability criterion, where in specific
subsections, it erects barriers for flawed extension of market exclusivity.128 This then
ensures that the rights and obligations of all stakeholders are recognized within the
patent regime.129 More specifically, the Section prohibits patents that would
otherwise impede advancement in public health and nutrition.130
Section 83 is very thorough in charting specific exclusionary guidelines in
bringing to light an intellectual property regime committed to social justice in
ensuring equality of all stakeholders. Thus, it refuses to provide a patentability
umbrella for a range of products that includes: (i) product patents that might
interfere with the federal government’s actions in protecting public health,131 and (ii)
product patents that might pose significant barrier towards making necessary drugs
available to the low income people at reasonably affordable prices.132 Such social
justice threads of Section 83 are the intellectual precursor to Section 3(d). Clearly,
therefore, with the necessary ground already established, 3(d) has simply followed a
predictable trajectory.
Now, to further contextualize Section 3(d), its relationship with the main
Chapter 2133 is worth recognizing. Within the Indian Patent Act, Chapters 2 and 3,
taken in conjunction, create a framework that neatly delineates between inventions
that are not patentable with those that are patentable.134 With the overall objective
of Section 3 to provide guidelines for what are not inventions,135 additional clarity is
introduced in 3(d). Both Chapters 2 and 3 also provide a nuanced linkage between
inventions and patentable elements.136 When two dichotomous elements have been
juxtaposed, they are granulated by distinguishing between (i) a class that recognizes

[w]hile considering amendment to the Act, efforts have been made to make the
law not only TRIPS complaint [sic] but also to provide therein necessary and
adequate safeguards for protection of public interest, national security, biodiversity, traditional knowledge, etc. Opportunity is also proposed to be availed
of for harmonising the procedure for grant of patents in accordance with
international practices and to make the system more user friendly.

Id.

See Amendment Act of 2002, supra note 123, § 83.
Carlos M. Correa, Public Health and Patent Legislation in Developing Countries, 3 TUL. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 3 (2001) (noting that TRIPS type intellectual property regimes can
have such pronounced impact on access to medicines revolving around “life-or-death consequences”).
130 Id. at 4.
131 See Amendment Act of 2002, supra note 123; Novartis Supreme Court Decision, supra note
17, ¶ 17 (“We have borne in mind the object which the amending Act wanted to achieve namely, to
prevent evergreening; to provide easy access to citizens of the country to life saving drugs and to
discharge their constitutional obligation of providing good health care to its citizens.”).
132 Novartis Supreme Court Decision, supra note 17, ¶ 42.
133 Id. ¶¶ 45–46.
134 The 1970 Act, supra note 44 (stating under Chapter II what inventions are not patentable,
whereas Chapter III discusses how to apply for patents under the Act).
135 Novartis IPAB Order, supra note 17, at 186.
136 Id. at 179 (stating that the “patentability of an alleged invention is basically determined by
establishment of novelty (anticipation), inventive step and industrial applicability of a product or a
process [section 2(1)(j), and 2 (1) (l) of the Act] to the exclusion of inventions which are not
patentable listed in section 3 and 4 of the Act.”).
128
129
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that certain products may not be deemed inventions, and (ii) the other class that
indicates that despite being inventions, certain products may not be granted patents
based on other considerations, such as lacking a specifically articulated criterion.137
Clearly, the exclusionary criterion enshrined in 3(d)’s efficacy test has its origin
within the meaning of these sections of the Indian Patent Act. Combining this
linkage with the legislative history behind 3(d) provides us with an important
baseline through which to evaluate the historical viability, and thus, the
constitutionality of Section 3(d) within the Indian constitutional framework.
The genesis of 3(d) is linked to Indian patent regime’s obligation to the
developing world. In the eyes of the developing and the least developed nations,
India is a messianic figure that provides for life saving drugs to the millions of poor
and uninsured. In recognizing India’s status as the pharmacy for the world’s poor,
the legislators paid careful attention to the growing apprehension that abuse of
product patent in medicine might lead to widespread deprivation of life saving
medicine.138 Thus, prompted by their fear in extending excessive monopolies to
pharmaceutical companies, the lawmakers debated over words and explanations that

137 The 1970 Act, supra note 44, § 10(4)(a)–(b); Cynthia M. Ho, Global Access to Medicine: The
Influence of Competing Patent Perspectives, FORDHAM 35 INT’L L.J. 1, 48–49 (2011).
138 Novartis Supreme Court Decision, supra note 17, ¶ 76. Commenting on the legislative
process prior to the enactment of 3(d) in its Patent Law, the Indian Supreme Court observed:

Parliament had an absolutely unenviable task on its hands. It was required to
forge, within a very limited time, an Act that would be TRIPS compliant without,
in any way, compromising on public health considerations. It is seen above that
the TRIPS Agreement had aroused grave concerns about its impact on public
health. India had learnt from experience the inverse relationship between
product patents and the indigenous pharmaceutical industry, and its effects on
the availability of essential drugs at affordable prices. It is also seen above that
after the patent system in India barred the grant of patents for pharmaceutical
and chemical substances, the pharmaceutical industry in the country scaled great
heights and became the major supplier of drugs at cheap prices to a number of
developing and under developed countries. Hence, the reintroduction of product
patents in the Indian patent system through the TRIPS Agreement became a
cause of alarm not only in this country but also for some international agencies.

Id. This sentiment was corroborated by the following excerpts from a letter from the HIV/AIDS
Director of the World Health Organization (“WHO”), dated December 17, 2004, to the Minister of
Health and Family Welfare, Government of India:
We would like to bring to your attention that several of our Member States have
expressed their concern that in the future, generic antiretroviral drugs from India
may no longer be available to them. Among other places, these concerns were
expressed by the delegations of Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, and Namibia at our
recent Procurement & Supply Management (PSM) Workshop in Nairobi, Kenya
(2–9 December, 2004), and by Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Korea,
Laos, Thailand, Papua New Guinea, and Vietnam at the Asian Regional
Workshop on the WTO/TRIPS Agreement and Access to Medicines held in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia (28–30 November 2004).

Id.
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can carry lasting and impactful meaning for the amended Section 3(d).139 Thus,
when the phrase “[t]he mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which
does not result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance”140 was
added to the original Section, the focus was on life saving medicines and drugs, which
also have constitutional imprimatur within the Indian context.141
139 Id. ¶ 80. During the debate surrounding the passage of the bill in the Indian Parliament,
one law maker observed:

India has benefited from the low cost generic industry to dominate 30 per cent of
the low cost drugs in the world . . . . Secondly, it (the bill) is vague about the
evergreening effect in which companies extend their patent rights by switching
from capsules to tablets, for instance. This extends monopolies. Parliament must
make sure that it protects the rights of India to make these generic drugs. We
should remove the provision that allows this evergreening . . . . What should and
what should not be patentable has also been left open to interpretation. Earlier,
the new use for a substance could not be patented. Now this has been qualified to
allow it by putting “mere new use” instead of “new use.”

Id. Similar sentiment was echoed by another lawmaker:
Sir, a company which obtains a patent by changing their chemicals, before the
expiry of the patent, they will again apply for a patent and again get a patent. So,
in this way, they will continue to get a patent for the same medicine. For
example, the drug called ‘Glevic’ (sic Gleevec/Glivec), is used for the treatment of
Leukaemia. It is patented by Novartis. This was originally patented in 1993.
The cost of the drug for the treatment of this disease comes to about Rs.1,20,000
per month in India. At the same time, the generic versions are available in the
country which cost only Rs.8,000 to Rs.10,000.

Id. ¶ 82.

140 Id. ¶ 83. Unique in its statutory implication and unparalleled as a patentability criteria,
Section 3(d) incorporates the widely used patent eligibility criteria of “innovativeness” by borrowing
the drug regulatory term “efficacy” as a bright line rule for determining the patentability of
pharmaceutical inventions. On the surface, the procedural instrumentality seems straightforward,
but the application leaves open the possibility of interpretation due to the requirement of selecting
measurement benchmark. “Efficacy” has been borrowed from the European Union Directive on drug
regulation, which states:

a medicinal product which has the same qualitative and quantitative composition
in active substances and the same pharmaceutical form as the reference medicinal
product, and whose bioequivalence with the reference medicinal product has been
demonstrated by appropriate bioavailability studies. The different salts, esters,
ethers, isomers, mixtures of isomers, complexes or derivatives of an active
substance shall be considered to be the same active substance, unless they differ
significantly in properties with regard to safety and/or efficacy. In such cases,
additional information providing proof of the safety and/or efficacy of the various
salts, esters or derivatives of an authorised active substance must be supplied by
the applicant.

Id. ¶ 185 n.1.
141 THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, Nov. 26, 1949, Part IV, art. 47. Any development within the
Indian legal system, India’s international treaty obligations must have to be balanced with its
constitutional adherence to the promotion of health and human rights. Thus, reformatting its
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The above provides a snapshot of legislators’ extensive due diligence and
prolonged discussions in enacting 3(d).142 It also opens a window into the burdens
legislators had to carry in structuring this amendment.143 Revealed in various letters
and pleas, the amendments to Indian patent law carried with it the hopes of many
developing countries, where purchasing life saving drugs at the world market prices
continue to be beyond reach of the majority.144 Prompted by their responsibility to
ensure a semblance of equality in public access to medicine, these lawmakers
evaluated every word within the amended Section.145 By duly incorporating
additional words, such as, “the mere discovery,”146 the legislators attempted to
narrow the scope of patentability for highly specialized drugs, with a clear agenda to
ensure that they never go beyond the reach of the poor.
The amended version of 3(d) is a product of legislative intent.147 And if the
legislators are the representatives of the people of the country, the language of 3(d)
represents the collective intent of its citizens. TRIPS incompatibility or asymmetric
trajectory relative to the global corporate viewpoint should certainly be subservient
to these sentiments.148
D. Preventing Evergreening—The Primary Objective
Thrust upon the world scene with an objective of leveling the playing field for
pursuing access to life saving drugs, Section 3(d) had an eventful arrival.149
Challenged by a very powerful pharmaceutical giant in its introductory invocation,
3(d) has already travelled a contentious road, a road rarely travelled by the
maximalist patent paradigms.150 Yet, if Indian patent regime were to rise up to its
obligation to its utilitarian fundamentals, the amendment must embody opposition to

patent regime required balancing its TRIPS obligation with its constitutional mandate towards the
protection of public health. For anecdotal examples of how the right to health has been a strong
constitutional force in Indian courts, see generally Saby Ghoshray, Searching For Human Rights To
Water Amidst Corporate Privatization In India: Coca-Cola V. Perumatty Grama Panchayat, 39
GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 643 (2007). Against this constitutional landscape, Article 47 and 39 (e)–
(f)’s duty to improve public health must be taken into consideration to properly evaluate the genesis
of Section 3(d) within India’s Patent law. See the “Directive Principles of State Policy” found in Part
IV, that states, “The State shall regard . . . the improvement of public health as among its primary
duties . . . .” CONST. INDIA art. 47; see also CONST. INDIA art. 37, 39(e)–(f). However, the Supreme
Court of India has declared, “it is now settled law that right to health is integral to right to life.”
Punjab v. Chawla, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 1225. With almost uncanny similarity to the United States’ Due
Process clause, the relevant Section notes, “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty
except according to procedure established by law.” CONST. INDIA art. 21.
142 See supra notes 138–141.
143 See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
144 See Novartis Supreme Court Decision, supra note 17, ¶ 76.
145 See supra notes 138–141 and accompanying text.
146 Novartis Supreme Court Decision, supra note 17, ¶ 83.
147 See supra notes 138–141.
148 See Novartis Supreme Court Decision, supra note 17, ¶ 76.
149 See id. ¶ 15.
150 Id.
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evergreening and patent layering.151 Section 3(d) presents such opposition; yet, it
allows meaningful inventions to have commercial success. However, developing a
robust definitional paradigm for meaningful innovation that is not contradictory to
social justice principles is a challenge. And the answer to that challenge was
introducing “efficacy.”152 Unfortunately, however, the requirement and significance
of efficacy in the context of 3(d) has not been adequately evaluated.153
Maximalist patent framework does not typically endorse an additional
preventive layer of efficacy or a meaningful inventive step such that a broad range of
innovations could be subject to patentability.154 A trifling change or minimal
modification in the existing product could become subject to new patent claim.155 In
this paradigm, a new coverage is envisaged by crafting simply a newer invention and
the patentee could garner exclusive rights over such minor modification of the
original.156 And the process can continue forever, as Figure 1 illustrates.

See id.
Novartis Madras H.C. Decision, supra note 19, ¶ 3.
153 Id.
154 Alan Devlin, Patent Law’s Parsimony Principle, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1693, 1709 (2010)
(stating generally that a maximalist approach provides patentees with the greatest level of
protection for their innovation).
155 Burcu Kilic & Luigi Palombi, The Question of Patent Eligible Subject Matter and
Evergreening Practices, INFOJUSTICE.ORG (July 27, 2013), http://infojustice.org/archives/30314.
(noting that in India “patent eligible subject matter may exclude certain trivial innovations from the
broad category of ‘inventions’”).
156 See id.
151
152
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FIGURE 1: EVERGREENING DELAYING WIDER ACCESS TO MEDICINE
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The scenario above could stymie competition, while the original patentee
continues on extracting monopoly rent.157 This could also decimate the interests of
other stakeholders within the framework.158 Therefore, in order to obtain a patent
under the Indian patent regime, an applicant having an existing patent who may
have incorporated a insignificant change or a minute enhancement is confronted with
a second layer of eligibility criteria.159 Section 3(d) specifically mentions, “a mere
discovery of a new form of a known substance”160 is unable to ever meet the threshold
of novelty and inventive step, pursuant to clauses j161 and j(a)162 of Section 2(l)163 of
the Indian Patent Act.
Residing within the deeper meaning of discovery is a spirit of heightened novelty
threshold. The clauses j and j(a) of the Indian Patent Act have responded to this by
requiring a specific inventive step. Because j and j(a) were incorporated prior to 3(d),
the development of 3(d) should be seen within a continuum with these two clauses.
Thus, 3(d)’s imposition of an extra layer of qualifying standard of patentability in the
form of efficacy should be recognized as coming from continuity, not via arbitrary
imposition.164
Arbitrariness was featured in Novartis’ challenge and therefore, requires further
evaluation.165 Novartis invoked arbitrariness to invalidate 3(d) by arguing its
contradiction with the fundamental right of equality.166 Novartis submitted that
efficacy has not been defined in the original patent act and thus, is subject to

157
158
159

See Discussion, supra Part III.
See Discussion, supra Part III.
See Novartis Supreme Court Decision, supra note 17, ¶ 103. The court stated:
The amended portion of section 3(d) clearly sets up a second tier of qualifying
standards for chemical substances/pharmaceutical products in order to leave the
door open for true and genuine inventions but, at the same time, to check any
attempt at repetitive patenting or extension of the patent term on spurious
grounds.

.Id.

Id. ¶ 100.
Id.
162 Id.
163 See id.
164 Novartis Madras H.C. Decision, supra note 19, ¶ 13 (stressing that under 3(d), patent
applicants have to show increased efficacy especially if the discovery is only a derivative of a known
substance); see also Novartis Supreme Court Decision, supra note 17, ¶ 104.
165 See Novartis Supreme Court Decision, supra note 17, ¶ 18; Madras High Court Dismisses
Novartis’ Petitions, THE HINDU, Aug. 7, 2007, http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tpnational/madras-high-court-dismisses-novartis-petitions/article1887489.ece [hereinafter High Court
Dismisses].
166 Novartis Supreme Court Decision, supra note 17, ¶¶ 16, 17; see also High Court Dismisses,
supra note 165.
160
161
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capricious invocation by the patent controller.167 Clearly, the appellant has ignored
the statutory history of how the extra layer has come to be codified within Indian
law, and by which efficacy came to encapsulate the legislative intention of that
development.
Section 3(d) simply puts a second layer of qualifying standards for
pharmaceutical products.168 Yet it does not foreclose genuine inventions.169 This
allows for true inventions to get the necessary patent protection, while rejecting any
attempt at repeatedly patenting or extending the patent term on spurious grounds.
Moreover, 3(d) sits at the intersection of patentability and invention.170 For example,
if the clause (d) is decoupled from the remainder of Section 3,171 and the original
legislative history of the Patent Act of 1970172 is forgotten, then Section 3(d) can be
seen as an extension of the definition of invention. In such case, if the clauses j and
j(a) of the Section 2(1) are combined with Section 3(d), on the superficial level, it
might appear that the Act creates multiple layers with diverging standards for
inventions for different product classes.173 However, if Section 3(d) is read in
conjunction with the entire legislative history of the original Act,174 its 2005
amendment,175 and the relevant clauses of Section of 2(l),176 Section 3(d) is revealed
in its cogent implications and robust applications.177
E. Deconstructing Efficacy of 3(d)
The word efficacy appears within both the text and explanation of 3(d).178
Linguistically, efficacy means, “the ability to produce a desired or intended result.”179
Novartis Madras H.C. Decision, supra note 19, ¶ 14; High Court Dismisses, supra note 165.
Id. ¶ 104.
169 Jitesh Kumar, The Glivec Case: Getting Beyond Efficacy, LIFE SCIENCES INTELL. PROP.
REV. (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.lifesciencesipreview.com/article/the-glivec-case-getting-beyondefficacy.
170 See infra, Part IV.
171 See Novartis Supreme Court Decision, supra note 17, ¶ 104.
172 Id.; see also Shamnad Basheer, India’s Tryst with TRIPS: The Patents (Amendment) Act
2005, 1 INDIAN J.L. & TECH. 15, 18 (2005), available at http://www.nls.ac.in/students/IJLT/
resources/1_Indian_JL&Tech_15.pdf (citing N.R. AYYANGAR, COMMITTEE REPORT ON THE REVISION
OF PATENTS LAW (1959)).
173 See infra, Part IV.
174 See Novartis Supreme Court Decision, supra note 17, ¶ 104.
175 See id. ¶¶ 102, 103.
176 Id.
177 See id. ¶¶ 102, 103.
178 Amendment Act of 2005, supra note 14, § 3(d).
179 Novartis Supreme Court Decision, supra note 17, ¶ 180. From the beginning, the Indian
court system, construed the meaning of efficacy within a narrow spectrum to mean therapeutic
efficacy. Id. Beginning with Madras High Court, which examined the scope of § 3(d) and
interpreted “efficacy” to convey only “therapeutic efficacy.” Id. In this construction, the Court relied
on the Dorland’s Medical Dictionary that defines efficacy as “the ability of a drug to produce the
desired therapeutic effect.” Id. ¶ 183. The Court further reasoned that the efficacy of a drug is
independent of the potency of the drug. Id. ¶ 180. Thus, by resorting to a narrow interpretation on
the meaning of the expression “therapeutic,” the High Court observed that the patent applicant
167
168
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Reading efficacy superficially might invite a wide range of possibilities for various
products. If we are to take efficacy by itself and without designating a class of
product, it might make for a perplexing regime. Implementation of efficacy,
therefore, would depend on a slew of factors: the function, the utility, and the
objective of the product under consideration. Could there be a robust way of
measuring efficacy? This newly introduced term, “efficacy,” within such a narrow
statutory construct, certainly leaves the door open for capricious determination by a
patent examiner. Therefore, it would be instructive here to provide a nuanced
analysis.
We can better appreciate the Supreme Court’s interpretation of efficacy by
adopting a product-specific analysis. Here the Supreme Court applied efficacy
specifically for pharmaceutical products. By introducing a new term, “therapeutic
efficacy” to qualify the term, the Court developed a more robust framework
surrounding the term “efficacy.” 180 Arguing that the function of a medicine is to cure
a disease, the Court reasoned that the testing for efficacy can be adequately
performed by measuring therapeutic efficacy.181 Yet, the Court had recognized the
difficulty of not having a standard or a consistent framework to measure therapeutic
efficacy.182 This therefore, invites us to introspect on a series of questions: What
shall the appropriate parameter for therapeutic efficacy be?
What are the
characteristics, advantages and benefits that can be brought forward for a
substantive determination of the enhancement of therapeutic efficacy?
Duly
recognizing these procedural uncertainties, the Court introduced a nuanced
framework for applying 3(d). This certainly has the desired effect of rescuing the
somewhat tenuous trajectory of 3(d) from its statutory uncertainty by steering it
toward a more robust application for pharmaceutical products.183
Thus, by
embarking into a new procedural framework, the Court has recast the original
efficacy into therapeutic efficacy. Introducing therapeutic efficacy still leaves open
the issue of its appropriate measurement for consistent application to determine
patentability for a wide-ranging product types.
From a definitional paradigm, efficacy gave life to 3(d), yet there is a missing
element that the Court attempted to provide, which leads me to explore whether this
automatically lends to judging therapeutic efficacy of a medicinal product strictly and
narrowly? Given that the introduction of 3(d) into the patent act has already raised
the bar much higher than before, does the argument for narrow and stricter
interpretation of therapeutic efficacy hold water?
To determine whether pharmaceutical substances and medicinal products must
receive a narrow and strict interpretation for their patent eligibility, a variety of
factors must be evaluated. Looking at the language of the statute, the 2005
Amendment introduced the condition of “enhancement of the known efficacy.”184
would have to demonstrate how effective the new discovery would be in either healing of a disease or
producing a good effect on the body. See supra Part IV.
180 See Novartis Madras H.C. Decision, supra note 19, ¶ 13.
181 Novartis Supreme Court Decision, supra note 17, ¶ 180.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id. at ¶ 180.

[13:719 2014]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

748

This was further explained in the attendant explanation, which would require that,
the derivative products “differ significantly in properties with regard to efficacy.”185
Although complex, the explanations can be distilled into specific observations. First,
we must recognize that not all advantages or beneficial properties are relevant.
Second, properties that can be identified for measuring efficacy must be carefully
isolated. In the case of medicinal products, such characteristics should form the
measurable parameters to demonstrate the therapeutic efficacy.
For the Novartis patent in question, various different products in many forms
have been submitted in the application.186 Each of these different forms is associated
with a subset of properties that are strictly inherent to that form.187 For example,
solubility is a strictly inherent property of a salt,188 like hygroscopic is characteristic
to a polymorphous compound.189 From its chemical composition, a salt and its
polymorphous equivalent, when manufactured, can be claimed as different
discoveries from the perspective of patent application.
Yet, following the
patentability standard of the current Indian regime would prompt us to apply the
higher threshold of 3(d).190 This in turn would require us to test whether there has
been enhancement of therapeutic efficacy in achieving the cycle of discovery from the
salt to the polymorphous compound.191
Application of the threshold test in this example, therefore, would require us to
find an applicable property of the claimed product which has a measurable criterion
for testing.192 This would help determine whether the quantum of efficacy has
increased from the prior patented product to the newly claimed product. In selecting
an applicable property, however, great care must be taken to identify only those
properties that can be both (i) measure effectively to demonstrate efficacy and, (ii)
are significantly different with respect to the specific efficacy being sought. Here,
unless the efficacy is shown to have increased significantly, a patent is rejected.193 A
mere change of form or inconsequential differences in form, from one type of property
to another, must not qualify as showing increased efficacy. Therefore, therapeutic

Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. ¶ 8 n.1.
187 Id. ¶ 181.
188 Id. Id.
189 Id.
190 Id. ¶ 180 n.1 (citing Oxford Dictionary of English). The Court in Novartis has construed the
operational meaning of efficacy “the ability to produce a desired or intended result.” Id. This led the
Court to conclude that, for pharmaceutical drugs, the desired result is to cure a disease, and thus
“not all advantageous or beneficial properties are relevant, but only such properties that directly
relate to efficacy, which in case of medicine, as seen above, is its therapeutic efficacy.” Id. ¶ 180.
Thus, when evaluating the efficacy of different compounds, say, between the alpha and the beta
form of Gleevec, a slew of characteristics could be available for observation, such as, thermodynamic
stability, lower hygroscopicity, enhanced bioavailability, etc. In the pre-3(d) patent regime, an
applicant could get away with showing any properties, ranging from hygroscopicity, stability,
bioavailability, for the purpose of patentability. Section 3(d), however, instituted an added layer—
an enhanced threshold through which to examine patentability. Thus, in the opinion of the Court,
the furnished properties did not meet the threshold to establish therapeutic efficacy. Id. ¶¶ 187–89.
191 Id. ¶ 180.
192 Id. ¶¶ 187, 192.
193 Id. ¶ 180; see also Amendment Act of 2005, supra note 14, § 3(d).
185
186
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efficacy has to be interpreted within a narrower spectrum and via a stricter
procedural analysis.
Yet, implementing such procedures comes with the
sophistication rigor that any complex chemical measurement calls for.
IV. SECTION 3(D) AND THE TRIPS COMPATIBILITY
The twin threads of Novartis’ challenge centered on 3(d)’s lack of
constitutionality and TRIPS incompatibility.194 TRIPS incompatibility has garnered
significant coverage, an area on which the Madras High Court has refrained from
ruling, citing jurisdictional grounds.195 It is time to evaluate the issue of TRIPS
compatibility within the broader rubric of Indian intellectual property regime.
The TRIPS framework sought to align global patentability regimes in line with
predominantly U.S. standards, and the feasibility of achieving this was recognized
early on.196 The resulting framework did not clearly define patentability criteria, nor
did it articulate a bright line of distinction between invention and patentability. In
many ways, the TRIPS agreement created a multi-layer exception paradigm that has
taken into account the different starting points from which member States began
their journey towards industrialization. Therefore, the only hurdle Section 3(d)
might face is if under a broader WTO panel evaluation the efficacy barrier is
eventually found to be in direct contravention of TRIPS.197 Here, the deterministic
benchmark would be to evaluate whether a required demonstration of efficacy invites
one of the two outcomes—either imposing an undue burden on the innovator, or the
194 Novartis Madras H.C. Decision, supra note 19, ¶ 1. Novartis’ constitutionality argument
focused on challenging 3(d)’s imposition of efficacy allowed patent examiner unfettered power of
arbitrariness. Id. ¶ 3 (arguing this to be in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution, INDIA
CONST. art. 14: “The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal
protection of the laws within the territory of India”). Novartis sought to invalidate 3(d)’s efficacy
threshold. The Court found “a broad distinction between discretion which has to be exercised with
regard to a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution and some other right which is given
by the statute.” Id. ¶ 34. Concluding that the statutory patent rights in question fall into the latter
category, the Court in essence, foreclosed the issue of constitutionality in the case. In addition, I
have shown elsewhere in this Article, see supra Part III, the deeper constitutional adherence given
to the protection of public health within the policy objective certainly closes the book on any issue of
unequal protection, as argued by Novartis.
195 Novartis Madras H.C. Decision, supra note 19, ¶ 4.
196 See Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L. L. 1, 7 (2004).
197 As discussed thus far in this Article, I have articulated the need for balancing
pharmaceutical companies’ right to obtain market exclusivity for their innovation with the
widespread apprehension about price of life saving drugs going outside the means of the millions.
This sentiment is found in the TRIPS agreement, as Article 7 mandates member States to work
towards a “balance of rights and obligations” that is “to the mutual advantage of producers and
users of technological knowledge and . . . conducive to social and economic welfare.” TRIPS, supra
note 11, art. 7 (“Objectives”). India’s legislative debates and subsequent introduction of Section 3(d)
is a testament to countries’ difficulties in crafting the right balance between two competing
interests, while ensuring both innovation and wider access to the drugs. In this context, the
international agreements clearly favor the pharmaceutical giants, as when and if, drug companies
perceive existential danger within patent law in India, they are free to both file challenges through
the WTO and withdraw from the Indian market.
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patentability framework in the target jurisdiction is subject to arbitrary
determination. However, given its clear articulation,198 well established legislative
history,199 associated due diligence in its crafting,200 and a highly nuanced judicial
deterministic paradigm,201 Indian patent regime’s efficacy framework can no longer
be recognized as narrowly construed for TRIPS violation. Rather, it is of significant
value to trace the flexibility guidelines provided within TRIPS in formulation of 3(d).
Article 27 of TRIPS202 asserts that, “patents shall be available for any
inventions, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of
industrial application.”203 Lack of precise language leaves the door open for member
States to fill the gaps left in the guidance. Here, neither the term “inventive step”
nor, the term “capable of industrial application” has been clearly defined in the
TRIPS documents.
This would prompt member States to define their own
patentability criteria pursuant to their specific national interests. From a
comparative perspective, the term “inventive step”204 can be recognized as
synonymous with the term non-obvious.205 And, the term “capable of industrial
application”206 can be seen as conveying the meaning useful.207
TRIPS’ language reveals aspects of interconnectedness and diversity that the
agreement sought to embody within member States’ patent regimes.208 As countries
progressed through the cycle of civilization and arrived at respective industrial
development phases, they arrived at different times.209 In this diverging chronology,
technology posed differing advantages and challenges to the States.210 Responding to
specificities of situations impacting them, member States have historically crafted
their patentability criteria, both by responding to their unique challenges and by
utilizing their specific advantages.211 Uniqueness has been more pronounced in
certain fields, necessitating accommodation of bespoke and case specific concerns.212
The language of TRIPS recognizes this and therefore, allows member States the
flexibility to define patentability criteria in a manner that suits their specific
national interests.213 Western countries have periodically utilized such flexibility.

See supra Part III; Amendment Act of 2005, supra note 14, § 3(d).
See supra Part III.C; Amendment Act of 2002, supra note 123, § 83.
200 See supra Part III.C.
201 Id.; see Novartis Supreme Court Decision, supra note 17, ¶ 104.
202 TRIPS, supra note 11, art. 27.1.
203 Id.
204 Id. art 27.1 n.5.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id.; Alessandra Arcuri & Rosa Castro, How Innovative is Innovative Enough? Reflections
on the Interpretation of Article 27 TRIPS from Novartis v. Union of India, at 9 (SOC’Y OF INT’L
ECON. LAW, Working Paper No. 52/08), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=1159821.
208 See id.
209 See id.
210 Id. at 10–11 (inferring that the scope of patentability differs amongst WTO members due to
a number of variables); see also TRIPS, supra note 11.
211 Arcuri & Castro, supra note 207, at 10–11.
212 See id.
213 Id. at 11; TRIPS, supra note 11, art. 8.
198
199
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For example, in 2001 the U.S. Patent and Trade Office (“USPTO”) revised its utility
guidelines for biotechnology.214 Similarly, Germany recently introduced a provision
to restrict patent monopolies on a gene sequence.215 Therefore, if Section 3(d) follows
a trajectory similar to its U.S. and German counterparts and introduces refinement,
why must there be differing responses? Moreover, taking an expansive meaning of
the term, enhanced therapeutic efficacy could be recognized as synonymous to nonobviousness in Section 103 of the U.S. Patent Act.216 The robustness of 3(d)’s
nuanced approach can be recognized through its premise, which presumes most
forms of existing pharmaceutical substances are deemed obvious unless they exhibit
enhanced and substantive therapeutic efficacy.217
Article 27 of TRIPS endows a member State with the option to exclude certain
inventions from patentability, if their commercial exploitation is contrary to the
national interest or inconsistent with the settled law of the land.218 This exception
allows flexibility to member States in crafting their patentability framework to be in
line with their own interests. Moreover, members are also allowed to exclude various
method patents that are consistent with providing essential health and human
services to its citizens.219 Thus, the TRIPS agreement embodies a commitment to
public health and societal welfare. This commitment has also found resonance in
various WTO agreements and conferences. Most importantly, in the 4th WTO
Ministerial Conference in Doha on November 14, 2001,220 the following was adopted:
1. We recognize the gravity of the public health problems afflicting many
developing and least-developed countries, especially those resulting from
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics.
2. We stress the need for the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) to be part of the wider
national and international action to address these problems.

214 Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/utilexmguide.pdf. Such types of requirement are
also being applied by the EPO. Decision of the Opposition Division, EUROPEAN PAT. OFFICE 308
(June 2002).
215 In 2004, the German Parliament introduced legislative amendment to limit patent
protection on human gene sequences to “disclosed functions” at the time of the patent application.
As a result, any patent application on a human DNA sequence used for a specific function would not
be eligible to cover a second function discovered later by another researcher using the same DNA
sequence. See Ned Stafford, German Biopatent Law Passed, THE SCIENTIST (Dec. 9, 2004),
http://www.seedquest.com/News/releases/2004/december/10737.htm; Ghoshray, supra note 1, at
517–18.
216 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
217 See supra Part III.
218 See TRIPS, supra note 11, § 27.
219 Id.
220 World
Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002). This is also when they decided to extend exemptions for
pharmaceutical patent protection for LDN until 2016.
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3. We recognize that intellectual property protection is important for the
development of new medicines. We also recognize the concerns about its
effects on prices.
4. We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent
Members from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while
reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the
Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner
supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect public health and, in
particular, to promote access to medicines for all.221
Furthermore, TRIPS provide the following flexibility to its member States:
(a) In applying the customary rules of interpretation of public international
law, each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the
object and purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its
objectives and principles.
(b) Each member has the right to grant compulsory licences and the
freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licences are granted.
(c) Each Member has the right to determine what constitutes a national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood
that public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.
(d) The effect of the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement that are relevant to
the exhaustion of intellectual property rights is to leave each Member free
to establish its own regime for such exhaustion without challenge, subject to
the MFN and national treatment provisions of Articles 3 and 4.222
In evaluating TRIPS compatibility of a member State’s legal jurisdiction, we
must bear in mind the fundamental precept—a member State has flexibility to create
an individual paradigm that is resonant with its internal aspirations.223 The TRIPS
agreement has empowered its member States to craft their own patentability regimes
that reflect their diverging starting points from an agrarian way of life towards
industrialization. Thus, while TRIPS ensures that innovators have commercial
impetus, nowhere in the agreements does it advocate the granting of unfettered right

221 World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS agreement and public health,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, ¶ 1–4 (Nov. 20, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm [hereinafter WTO Declaration on TRIPS Agreement].
222 Id. ¶ 5(a)–(d).
223 Id. ¶ 4.
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of evergreening to pharmaceutical companies.224 Rather, despite its history of origin
being steeped in discontent among member States, its robust framework reveals a
commitment towards allowing member States to effectively combat corporate
monopoly rent-seeking behavior.225
Under the emerging rubric of Section 3(d), pharmaceuticals can no longer shape
the market exclusivity in their favor, nor, can they subsume broader public interest
within the predatory property rights framework.226 This is consistent with the
various flexibilities offered to the member States by the Articles 7,227 8,228 and 27 of
the TRIPS agreement, in conjunction with paragraphs 4,229 5,230 and 6231 of the Doha
Declaration. As member States are allowed to control their patent regimes in a
manner consonant with their broader national objectives, 3(d) encapsulates India’s
social justice goals, while giving primacy to public health.232 This is also in line with
the United Nations’ primary objective in structuring various conferences and
protocols to ensure any development towards adverse impact on public health is
effectively prevented. Thus, the Union of India is within its rights under the TRIPS
agreement to adjust its patentability criteria and set higher standards for patent
protection. And it is therefore TRIPS compliant. It is important to note that Indian
law must be judged and interpreted not by the colonialist prescription imposed by the
western world, but through the lens of its treaty obligation that allows it to set its
own goals and aspirations.
V. BROADER DIMENSIONS AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF NOVARTIS
The chief contribution of the Novartis decision is to introduce a new law—
Section 3(d) of the Indian Patent (Amendment) Act. By unleashing 3(d) on to the
global intellectual property landscape, Novartis signaled an effective provision
against market exclusivity extension mechanisms of pharmaceutical giants,233 while
declaring war against strict property rights based intellectual property frameworks.
Despite becoming a subject of sharp criticism for venturing into the unchartered
territory of structural revision in patentability,234 Novartis is laudable as one of the
path-breaking cases to arrive in 2013. It’s laudable for introducing a model for
224 Molly M. Chen, Reconsidering the U.S. Patent System: Lessons from Generics, 45 VAND.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1249, 1257 (2012).
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 See TRIPS, supra note 11, art. 7.
228 Id. art. 8.
229 See WTO Declaration on TRIPS Agreement, supra note 221.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 See Ellen F.M. ’T Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to Essential Medicines:
Seattle, Doha and Beyond, in ECONOMICS OF AIDS AND ACCESS TO HIV/AIDS CARE IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES; ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 39 (2003).
233 See India’s Novartis Decision, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2013) (noting that “India decided to
prevent drug companies from getting monopoly protection on updated drugs that did not represent a
major advance over previous versions—a practice often referred to as ‘evergreening’”).
234 Id.
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erecting a bulwark against corporate monopoly rent-seeking practices. It’s pathbreaking for its long-standing implications on at least four areas.
First, retrenching from novelty and non-obviousness line of reasoning, Novartis
reduced the scope for pharmaceutical products, while staying within applicable
patentability framework for pharmaceuticals. This is a new development. Prior to
2005, pharmaceutical products could not be patented in India.235 This Amendment
has brought pharmaceuticals under patent eligibility, but developed a layered
deterministic paradigm to reduce the scope of pharmaceutical patents.
Second, by rejecting the seductive urge for conformity with western laws,
Novartis blazed a divergent path in formulating 3(d) that resonated with the social
justice and utilitarian themes of equality. By reconciling India’s treaty obligations
with its human rights imperatives, 3(d) imposed a human rights component into the
market-driven intellectual property framework.236 Responding to the aspirations of
billions that rely on India’s generic drug market for survival,237 Novartis sought to
level the playing field in the procurement of humanity’s basic survival needs.238
Third, recognizing TRIPS’ contentious origin and long simmering discontent of
the developing regimes,239 3(d) can be recognized as a model of patentability for
developing nations to follow. If evaluated without bias, 3(d) can be utilized as a
much needed hybrid framework that can bridge the schism between the maximalist
and minimalist paradigms of patentability.
Fourth, Novartis signals a judiciary interest in seeing harmonization of patent
regimes across the globe. While the contours of such harmonization might not be as
clear-cut, viewing Novartis in conjunction with some of the earlier cases, we can
certainly conceptualize a future where laws of Nations may be showing tendencies to
merge. Next, I discuss these four threads in detail.
A. Scope Reduction of Patentability via 3(d)
Novartis narrowed the scope of patents by reasoning that novelty and nonobviousness considerations should not form the core necessary requirement in
determining patentability.240 The Court needed a new requirement, a layer of
proving therapeutic efficacy, for going beyond the novelty and non-obvious
considerations.241 Therapeutic efficacy can be seen as having the same impact on
patentability of pharmaceuticals that the “markedly different characteristics”242 of
Diamond vs. Chakrabarty243 had on the patentability of biological products when that
See Amendment Act of 2005, supra note 14, § 2(h).
Id. § 3(d).
237 See James Love, The Production of Generic Drugs in India, BRIT. MED. J. (Mar. 22, 2011),
http://www.bmj.com/content/342/bmj.d1694.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 See Novartis Supreme Court Decision, supra note 17, ¶¶ 102–04.
241 Id.
242 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980).
243 Id. at 309–10 (upholding the patentability of man-made bacteria that devours oil droplets in
the ocean).
235
236
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seminal case arrived on the scene. With the introduction of 3(d), the novelty and
non-obviousness characteristics can neither hold primacy nor stand alone in their
deterministic objective, thereby attenuating the force of their requirement in the
framework. Thus, by enhancing the force of therapeutic properties of the invention
in determining patentability, the Court may have signaled that the novelty and nonobviousness characteristics have lesser patentability value than the newly introduced
efficacy requirement.244
A discussion of some aspect of the comparative nuances of the two patent
regimes might be helpful in adequately contextualizing the 3(d) consequences.
Despite their similarities on many aspects, the Indian patent regime and the U.S.
patent regime differ significantly. The U.S. patent office could consider the validity
of a patent if the invention contained some of the desired therapeutic properties, even
if they lacked markedly different distinguishable characteristics, although the
paradigm has shifted somewhat in the post-Myriad landscape.245 Within the U.S.
context however, in a competition between the markedly different characteristics and
the therapeutic properties, the latter could win even if the markedly different
characteristic is conspicuous by its absence in the invention.246 As if by following the
cue from the post-Myriad framework in the U.S., the Indian Supreme Court has
narrowed the older paradigm’s expansive limits. By specifically observing the
framework to be unnecessarily encompassing, the Court prevented patentability
criteria to be vaguely amenable to all kinds of claims.247 The fundamental question is
therefore whether therapeutic efficacy can be used as a patentability threshold to
measure the diagnostic utility of the drug in question and whether this diagnostic
aspect in of itself invokes similar transformative idea as contained in markedly
different characteristics paradigm. Thus, 3(d)’s synonymous application of the
markedly different characteristics seems to have the potential to invalidate
patentability of many pharmaceutical products with just incremental changes and
less therapeutic value.
B. Dissecting Novartis’ Human Rights Dimension
The scope restriction in Novartis should be recognized as the judiciary’s attempt
to introduce functional efficiency in the patentability doctrine.248 Technology’s
advancement has allowed pharmaceuticals companies to make constant changes in
the original product in an effort to claim inventions for perpetuity. Within a
decidedly maximalist paradigm, this could mean pharmaceutical companies could
prolong their control of market exclusivity for decades, leaving access to life saving
drugs out of reach for most. Looking at the explosion of patents in the last three
decades under an overtly inclusive patent paradigm, the right to health for all
humanity has, therefore, become a fleeting afterthought. Lost in this frenzy are the
244
245
246
247
248

See Novartis Supreme Court Decision, supra note 17, ¶¶ 102–04.
See Ghoshray, supra note 1, at 523–24.
Id.
See Novartis Supreme Court Decision, supra note 17, ¶¶ 102–04, 191–92.
See Basheer & Reddy, supra note 98, at 239.
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interests of various stakeholders.
Section 3(d) recalibrated such contour of
patentability by encapsulating diverging stakeholder interests: the multi-national
companies, the domestic pharmaceutical industry, and the consumers. Here, 3(d)
elevates the “floor” by limiting patent protection to new chemical entities and their
derivatives on condition of substantive enhancement of therapeutic efficacy, which in
turn allows the rights of more individuals to be recognized within the patent
discourse.249
Western patent paradigms provide a dynamic lens through which to see the
interplay between bounty and suffering. This paradox has to be evaluated through
its inherent dichotomy within the global patent landscape. Patentability doctrines
have evolved through the quintessential tension between the two frameworks, one
predicated on the idea of state supervision and the other premised on monopoly rent
based corporate ownership of natural resources. Maximalist patent paradigms are
antithetical to the human rights dimensions of various UN declarations that promote
fundamental rights to health and longevity.250
Woven within the real life
background of Novartis is the narrative of human sufferings borne out of delayed
medical care and lack of access to drugs.251 The Court’s ruling, therefore, invites us
to take a retrospective inquest at searching for patent law’s legal lineage under
mankind’s common heritage. More than 150 years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court
recognized the abstract fundamentals of human invention by tracing its roots in a
shared humanity in observing that:
The Supreme Court has recognized that scientific principles and laws of
nature, even when for the first time discovered, have existed throughout
time, define the relationship of man to his environment, and, as a
consequence, ought not to be the subject of exclusive rights to any one
person.252
Therefore, Novartis’ scope reduction must appropriately be seen through a human
rights lens. 3(d)’s imposition of a new patentability layer imposes a human rights
obligation on the part of the State to ensure human rights concerns are carefully
balanced with the innovator’s right to extract commercial incentive for innovation.
This is especially significant, as technology’s advancement has allowed
pharmaceutical companies to engage in excessive experimentation of random
isolation and purification of chemical compounds. Either by data mining or by using
computer algorithms, pharmaceutical companies can generate a wide range of
products, most of which can be subject to patent application. By making simple
changes in the original drug, companies can strive for patent eligibility for eternity,
in the process preventing the access to essential drugs for the masses. Novartis

249
250
251
252

See Novartis Supreme Court Decision, supra note 17, ¶¶ 104, 191–92.
See Ghoshray, supra note 1, at 525.
See Novartis, LAWYERS COLLECTIVE, supra note 73.
In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 795 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
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foreclosed this human rights abuse within the Indian context, a model that certainly
can be followed by other developing countries.253
C. Rebalancing TRIPS Discontent in The Shadow of Patentability Schism
To comprehend Novartis is to review the genesis of 3(d) within the context of
developing nations’ obligation to reformat their patent regime. While elucidating the
virtues of the TRIPS agreement in comporting to the flexible needs of its member
States,254 we certainly cannot overlook its predatory genesis.255 Despite its U.S.-led
property rights-centric origin and TRIPS’ contentious history of discontents and
disagreements has been subsumed under a coercive imposition of western-centric
perspectives. Section 3(d)’s layered imposition of heightened patentability is a path
forward towards restoring balance in the international patent regime.256 Thus,
viewed through such an evolutionary response lens,257 3(d) can be seen as a
legitimate evolution of developing countries’ aspirations towards equality and social
justice.
The innovative force of Section 3(d) not only helps realign patent
framework’s asymmetric contour, it also extricates global intellectual property norm
from the inertia of old world order.
Section 3(d) sits at the confluence of two conflicting priorities. On one side is the
asymmetry in income and economic viability calling for intervention towards making
access to essential drugs a universal reality. On the other side, seduction to
industrialization prompting developing countries to become obligated to join WTO,
despite their discontents.258 With its explicit provision to align the interest of all
stakeholders, 3(d) can be used as a prototype for the emerging economies of the
world. In an era where developing countries are finding it difficult to incorporate
anti-evergreening or anti-patent layering within their patent regimes, 3(d) could act
as a benchmark for others to follow. Moreover, as developed countries continue to
forge coalition against patent regimes with such evergreening laws,259 following
India’s lead might help in building a coalition of patent regimes with human rights
sentiments.260 Not only will this help in making a level playing field in a deeply
253 See, e.g., Lissett Ferreira, Access to Affordable HIV/AIDS Drugs:
The Human Rights
Obligations of Multinational Pharmaceutical Corporations, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1133, 1137 (2002)
(concluding that the high cost of HIV/AIDS drugs due to patent protection is a human rights
violation).
254 See TRIPS, supra note 11.
255 Peter Drahos, Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property Standardsetting, COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 29, http://www.iprcommission.org/
papers/pdfs/study_papers/sp8_drahos_study.pdf (last visited May 10, 2014).
256 See generally Novartis Supreme Court Decision, supra note 17, ¶¶ 102–04, 180.
257 Id.
258 See generally WORLD TRADE ORG., 2007 WTO PUBLIC FORUM: HOW CAN THE WTO HELP
HARNESS GLOBALISATION? 135 (2008), available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/
public_forum07_e.pdf.
259 The Complete Text of the U.S. Proposal for the TPP IPR Chapter, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY
INT’L (Feb. 10, 2011), available at http://keionline.org/node/1091.
260 See e.g., Ryan Abbott, Of Evergreening and Efficacy, Part III, HARVARD LAW PETRIE-FLOM
CTR. (April. 16, 2013), https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/billofhealth/2013/04/16/of-evergreening-and-
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divisive intellectual property landscape, it might rebalance the original discontent
countries felt at the asymmetric imposition of TRIPS on their respective intellectual
property regimes.
D. Examining Novartis’ Harmonizing Dimension
An expanded meaning of Novartis opens up some illuminating aspects. Viewing
Novartis within a broader corpus made of select opinions from diverging regimes may
signal an undercurrent of harmonization. There is a paradox in law at play here.
Strictly speaking, the global intellectual property landscape is divided between a
maximalist and a minimalist paradigm. Yet, globalization calls for conformity and
convergence in Nations’ laws. It is not ideal for a maximalist framework to be the
model for others to follow, simply because it lacks a human rights dimension and is
predominantly based on a strict property rights dimension. Therefore, any variants
of minimalist patent paradigm could be used as models for harmonizing global patent
law.
Evaluating Novartis in light of some other cases from the U.S. and the U.K., we
might be witnessing a newer thought process percolating amongst the judiciary.
Although Novartis falls within a continuum in the annals of Indian constitutional
decision, the Indian Supreme Court’s opinion in Novartis acquires a superior
interpretative gloss if further dissected through the patentability thresholds
established in Monsanto Tech. LLC v. Cefetra BV (“Cefetra”)261 and Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Human Genome Sciences (“Eli Lilly”).262 A newer patentability threshold for the
DNA sequence in Cefetra was established by requiring a direct connection between
the invention and the function it was designed for.263 In Eli Lilly, the patentability
threshold was pegged at responding to a two-step inventive step—whether the
patentable sequence should disclose its function, and whether this function has
concrete and immediate benefit.264 Similarly, by examining the questions raised by
Judge Sweet in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office
(“Myriad”),265 a patentability threshold was set at determining whether the claimed
invention is fundamentally different.266 By placing Novartis’ new threshold of
efficacy-part-iii/ (stating countries such as Argentina and the Philippines have incorporated
provisions similar to Section 3(d) of India's provision and predicting that “[i]n the aftermath of [the
Novartis] case, it is more likely other countries will follow India’s lead” that [the Novatis case] “may
be a signal regarding changing political attitudes toward the demands of multinational
corporations”) (referring to Novartis Madras H.C. Decision, supra note 19).
261 Case C-428/08, Monsanto Tech. LLC v. Cefetra BV, 2010 E.C.J. EUR-Lex LEXIS 396
[hereinafter Cefetra].
262 [2008] EWHC (Pat) 1903, [2008] R.P.C. 29, aff’d, [2010] EWCA Civ 33, [2010] R.P.C. 29
(Eng.) [hereinafter Eli Lilly].
263

See Cefetra, supra note 261 at ¶ 79.

See Eli Lilly, supra note 262, at 99.
Ass‘n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Pat. & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 226
(S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d-in-part, rev’d-in-part sub nom. 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), aff’d-in-part,
rev’d-in-part 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012), aff’d-in-part, rev’d-in-part sub nom. 133 S. Ct. 2107
(2013).
266 Id. at 226.
264
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determining whether the compound demonstrate enhanced efficacy within the corpus
of these three cases, it can be argued that there may be a convergence of thought
process developing among the judiciaries. The similarity underscores a growing
consensus towards restricting the scope of patentability for biological and
pharmaceutical products that have implications for human health and longevity.267
This indeed is a broader indication of the emergence of a newer minimalistic patent
paradigm. As Novartis embarks on a decidedly minimalist patent paradigm, its
shared ideals with patent cases from other jurisdiction are an encouraging indication
for both the shared heritage of humanity and their human rights sentiments.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This Article opens a window into the maximalist-minimalist schism of
patentability centering on the Indian Supreme Court’s Novartis case. Viewing
Novartis’ reduced scope of patentability for pharmaceutical innovation through the
prism of the amended Section 3(d), Indian intellectual property paradigm’s misplaced
condemnation is re-examined.
Deconstructing the criticism surrounding 3(d)
required an evaluation of its genesis, which proceeded in three major segments.
First, understanding the context and prevailing landscape of criticism further
corroborated global patent paradigm’s deep schism and maximalist framework’s
decoupling from social justice values. Second, contextualizing 3(d) through its roots
and development allowed for an adequate and comprehensive appreciation of its
constitutionality and TRIPS compatibility. Third, going beyond rehabilitating 3(d),
this Article sought an expanded meaning of Novartis, which is not only laudatory
but, also path-breaking.
Contemporary wisdom placed Indian intellectual property regime in a wideranging criticism from troubled to inefficient to inadequate. Riding the similar wave
of condemnation, the Novartis decision has been criticized for its reliance on Section
3(d).268 Evaluating the logic behind the court’s conclusion, this Article basks in the
excitement of Novartis’ arrival on the global patent landscape, while rehabilitating
Section 3(d) in multiple steps.
By charting through its legislative history and its placement in the continuum of
India’s constitutional jurisprudence, 3(d) is seen both as a natural progression in law
and a revitalization of human rights element in the global stage. Moreover, 3(d)’s
nuanced framework in delivering a multi-layer approach to patentability is evaluated
with rigor to place it on firmer footing. Finally, 3(d)’s TRIPS compatibility is
reviewed and found to be robust.
Going beyond the patentability discussion, this Article sought the expanded
meaning of Novartis and identified four broader themes.269 First, retrenching from
the novelty and non-obviousness line of reasoning, Novartis reduced the scope for
Amy Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discontents, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1571, 1616 (2009).
See e.g., Frederick M. Abbott, Inside Views: The Judgment In Novartis v. India: What The
Supreme Court Of India Said (Apr. 4, 2013, 4:33 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/2013/04/04/thejudgment-in-novartis-v-india-what-the-supreme-court-of-india-said/.
269 See supra Part V.
267
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pharmaceutical products, while staying within applicable patentability framework
for pharmaceuticals.270 Second, by rejecting the seductive urge for conformity within
western laws, Novartis blazed a divergent path in formulating 3(d) that resonated
with the social justice and utilitarian themes of equality.271 Third, recognizing
TRIPS’ contentious origin and long simmering discontent among the developing
regimes, 3(d) can be recognized as a model of patentability framework for other
Nations.272 Fourth, Novartis signals a judiciary interest in seeing harmonization in
patent regimes across the globe.273
Finally, this Article is about recalibration, it is about deconstructing a false
narrative. It is about challenging the myth percolating through the corporate
dominated patent paradigm that has become the driving force in the western patent
framework. Despite corporate reluctance, perhaps in the not so distant future, the
path to patentability may begin to straddle some of the humanistic contours
identified here. In such traversal, our ethical compass must be guided by the realm
of sacred, a sacred borne out of our longing for human rights of all mankind and
fundamentals of distributive justice.
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See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
See Novartis Supreme Court Decision, supra note 17.
See supra Part V.

